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Abstract  
 
In this paper we use new, detailed and comprehensive linked firm-product data to describe 
various dimensions of the Chinese export boom from 2000-2007.  Our analysis indicates that 
firm entry played a larger role in China's export boom than is the case in other countries, and 
that processing firms were an important component of this.  Our estimates of value-added 
suggest that the foreign content of China's exports is much higher than previously estimated.  
Finally, our estimates of technological intensity show that Chinese exports had been 
increasingly intensive in technology, but the overall intensity is lower when the exports are 
evaluated by domestic value-added than by final value. 
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This paper attempts to provide a systematic assessment of the Chinese export boom from 2000 to 2007, 
which made China rise from a top five exporter to a top two exporter. The surge was accompanied with 
dramatic changes in general trade environment resulting mainly from China’s attainment of WTO 
membership. Such an extraordinary growth with institutional changes offers us an interesting setting to 
explore the growth structure of exports from both theoretical points of view and empirical points of view. 
 
We find the net entry of exporting firms contributed half of the overall export growth, much larger than 
what is found in other studies. Meanwhile, processing firms are found to have significantly dominated 
other types of firms in the boom, especially in terms of the growth in their number. Firms entered into the 
export market more intensively in labour-intensive industries, while existing exporting firms expanded their 
exports more dramatically in capital-intensive industries. The above evidence is consistent with the fact 
that there were large reductions in trade barriers for Chinese firms but also uncovers the huge internal 
heterogeneity across sectors and the specific ways how the trade liberalisation impacted the export 
market through firm entry in China. 
 
We then develop an accounting method to measure the domestic value-added in Chinese exports, which 
fits the Chinese case. The method is improved based on Hummels et al.’s (2001) (HIY) measuring 
framework of vertical specialisation by taking into account the difference between processing trade and 
ordinary trade. The share of China’s value-added in exports is shown to be only 30%, lower than what 
would be obtained by the HIY method. 
 
Finally, as expected, we find general technological improvement in Chinese exports, although the lower-
technology industries are still found to have tended to export higher proportions of their products than 
higher technology industries. More interestingly, the technology intensity of Chinese value-added in 
exports was lower than that of exports measured in export value. This finding is novel and it seems that 
the ``surprising" big numbers might be to some extent misleading and might have covered some important 
facts: technological improvement during the export boom had not changed the product composition of 
China's own domestic content in exports as much as its final export value implied to many researchers. 1 Introduction
China’s export growth in the ﬁrst decade of the 21st Century has been remarkable. The
average growth rate of manufactured exports between 2000 and 2007 was over 30% per
year, some 10 percentage points higher than during the previous eight years. China’s
share in world’s trade in merchandize almost tripled, jumping from 4.7% in 2000 to
12% in 2007. This period was also one in which China became increasingly integrated
into the institutions of world trade, most notably via its inclusion in the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) in 2001.
WTO accession has had a two-fold eﬀect on China. On the one hand, trade barriers
of various kinds have had to be removed to create a fairer and freer environment for
investment and trade. Import tariﬀs were eliminated or reduced, and all import quotas
on industrial goods were removed by 2005. As a result, the unweighted average tariﬀ
rate decreased from 16.4% in 2000 to below 10% by 2007. At the same time, export
subsidies to domestic ﬁrms which were inconsistent with WTO rules were largely re-
moved, foreign suppliers were allowed to retail their products, and foreign investment
approvals were no longer subject to some mandatory requirements such as technology
transfer or local content requirements (Rumbaugh and Blancher, 2004).
On the other hand, China also began to beneﬁt from easier access to overseas markets.
Chinese exports no longer faced discriminative tariﬀs and quotas as compared to exports
from other countries, although for some speciﬁc products (for example, textiles and
apparels) safeguards provisions and surveillance strategies would continue to operate.
More fundamentally, upon entry into the WTO, all trade began to be supervised and
regulated under uniform and transparent WTO rules, including those regarding the
settlement of conﬂicts. Together, these changes not only brought about a climate
which was increasingly favourable for the inﬂux of foreign capital and goods, but also
encouraged Chinese ﬁrms to engage export activities.
In this paper we use new, detailed and comprehensive linked ﬁrm-transaction data to
describe various dimensions of the export boom. We contribute both to the growing
literature which describes the Chinese export boom, and to the literature on the microe-
conomic mechanisms which underly a trade liberalisation. China provides a fascinating
example in this regard because of the scale of the liberalisation, the size of the subse-
1quent increase in exports and the increasing role of China as part of global production
chains.
The data we use comprise an annual census of all large manufacturing ﬁrms in China
over the period 2000-2007, and a monthly transaction-level database of all merchandise
passing through Chinese customs from January 2003 to December 2006. We are able
to link the datasets together, and the linked ﬁrm-transaction information enables us to
provide a series of new facts about the Chinese export boom.
This paper focuses on three main questions:
1. In an accounting sense, what is the source of the export boom? Is it due to an
increase in the extensive or intensive margins of exporting? What types of ﬁrm,
what types of exports and which industries account for the export boom?
2. How has the domestic content of Chinese exports changed? Does the fact that
processing and assembly are such an important fraction of exports mean that the
domestic content of exports is particularly small?
3. How has the technology intensity of Chinese exports changed? Have Chinese
exporting ﬁrms become more skill and capital intensive, or does the reliance on
processing and assembly mean that Chinese exporters are in fact still quite labour
intensive?
An overview of this study is given as follows.
First, we are able to decompose the growth in exports into contributions at the intensive
and extensive margin at both ﬁrm- and product-level. We show that the Chinese
export market exhibited great turnover in the eight years after 2000, and the entry of
new exporting ﬁrms contributed half of the export growth. The turnover is larger than
what is found for other countries, and is consistent with the fact that China experienced
some large degree of trade liberalization in this period, which was signiﬁed by its WTO
entry.
Among all types of ﬁrms, processing ﬁrms dominate ordinary trade ﬁrms in export
growth. Particularly, the growth in the number of processing ﬁrms alone explains 72%
of all export growth in our matched ﬁrm-product sample. Apart from these, there
2exists huge internal inequality in China’s export sector. Coastal region and foreign-
invested ﬁrms had much higher growth in export value, probably due to their geo-
graphical superiority and more connections with foreign markets. We also ﬁnd evidence
that labour-intensive industries saw more export growth at the extensive margin while
capital-intensive industries experienced more export growth at the intensive margin.
The reason may be that it is easier for ﬁrms in labour-intensive industries to export
and they are more responsive to reductions in trade barriers.
Second, because we observe imports and exports by ﬁrms, we are able to provide a new
measure of the value-added in Chinese exports by examining the extents to which the
export value is from imported intermediates and from domestic value-added. We show
that the foreign content of Chinese exports is much higher than previously estimated,
and therefore the domestic content lower. On average the foreign content in Chinese
exports was about 70%, meaning that China’s own value-added only accounted for 30%
in its huge volume of exports. While coastal ﬁrms and foreign ﬁrms were the major
sources of the increase in foreign content share, non-state domestic ﬁrms (mostly private
ﬁrms) were the main contributor to the decrease in domestic content share. With regard
to ﬁrm dynamics, entering ﬁrms had lower domestic content than others, while existing
ﬁrms had much higher foreign content than others. This implies that engaging in
processing trade could probably greatly reduce not only entry costs of exporting but
also variable costs of exporting.
Third, we can examine the characteristics of ﬁrms which contributed to the growth in
exports, because we have measures of ﬁrms’ technological and human capital inputs.
For example, we have information on the skill composition of the workforce, R&D ex-
penditure and the development of new products. The results show that, in spite of this
technological improvement, lower-technology industries tended to export higher pro-
portions of their products than higher-technology industries did, which reﬂects China’s
comparative advantages had not been changed much. Moreover, it is also revealed
that a higher proportion of domestic value-added in exports was distributed in sections
of low-technology products than was ﬁnal value of exports. This ﬁnding is novel and
implies that the technological improvement during the export boom had not changed
the overall technology intensity of Chinese domestic content in exports as much as the
export value implied to many researchers.
3The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the var-
ious sources of data to be used in this study in more detail. In Section 3 we provide
a brief description of aggregate Chinese export patterns, using our data. Section 4
presents a simple decomposition which allows us to analyse the source of the export
boom. Section 5 proposes a new measurement method of vertical specialization that ﬁts
the Chinese case. We then assess the technological intensity of Chinese exports evalu-
ated both at the ﬁnal export value and domestic value-added in exports in section 6.
Section 7 summarises and concludes.
2 Data
There are two main sources of micro data, ﬁrm-level and transaction-level. The ﬁrm-
level data comes from the Chinese Annual Survey of Industrial Firms (CASIF) from
the National Bureau of Statistics in China (NBSC). The transaction-level data comes
from the database of the Chinese Customs Trade Statistics (CCTS) which is compiled
and maintained by the General Administration of Customs of China. Because these
data have not been used together previously, we describe them in some detail.1
2.1 Firm-level data
The CASIF survey data that we use covers the period 2000–2007. According to Cai
and Liu (2009), ﬁrms are given assurances that information from this survey will not be
released to the public or be used against them by other governmental agencies, such as
tax authorities. For these reasons, ﬁrms have less incentive to misreport the information
and the data is less likely to be manipulated by local governments.
Two groups of ﬁrms are included in the survey. The ﬁrst is all state-owned ﬁrms, and
the second is ﬁrms of other ownership types with annual sales above 5 million RMB
(equivalent to around 700 thousand USD). Because this threshold is in nominal terms,
there exists the possibility that the sample will get larger over time purely because of
price changes. On average, more than 200 thousand ﬁrms are included each year and
they account for around 95% of total Chinese industrial output and 98% of industrial
exports, covering over 39 two-digit industries, of which 30 belong to manufacturing
1Appendix A contains further details.
4industries, spread across all 31 mainland provinces and municipalities. In practice,
the NBSC implemented standard procedures to ask ﬁrms to report required details on
their production activities, accounting statement, and other basic characteristics such
as ownership structure, location and industry. In addition, each ﬁrm also reports their
total export value of shipments (if any) including products exported by the production
ﬁrms themselves (with export licence) and those exported through trading agents.
An important feature of the CASIF data for our purposes is that it has information on
ﬁrms’ technological and human capital inputs.2 The data include details of the qual-
iﬁcations of the workforce, expenditure on training, research and development (R&D)
expenditure, and value of new products.
We drop ﬁrms classiﬁed as being in the mining, energy, tobacco, and handicrafts indus-
tries.3 We also remove from the data those observations for which any of the following
conditions is satisﬁed:4
∙ Observations which report their location information in wrong formats.
∙ Observations which have missing or non-positive values on any of the variables
related to output, sales, capital, and intermediate inputs.
∙ Observations whose number of employees is missing or less than 8.
∙ Observations which have missing or negative values on any of the variables related
to ownership structure and export value.
∙ Observations whose value of sales are less than export value.
2Data on human capital is only available in 2004, so we are not able to study changes in these
inputs over time.
3See Appendix A.1 for more details on the cleaning procedures and the reasons for removing ﬁrms
in these industries.
4We drop observations rather than ﬁrms here because we want to keep as many observations in the
sample as possible. This could generate spurious gaps for some ﬁrms as their observations in certain
years are dropped by the above cleaning procedures. However, after checking the data, we ﬁnd only
1% of the ﬁrms in the original data have their gaps increased after cleaning. Moreover, the deﬁnition
of ﬁrm entry in the formal analysis later is only based on the data of the initial year (2000) and the
ending year (2007). By these two reasons, we believe the cleaning procedures here will not generate
serious problems to our analysis of ﬁrm dynamics.
5Firms removed from the sample comprise 17.8% of the total number of ﬁrms, and
contribute 21% of total export volume. The remaining sample consists of 1,404,934
observations (ﬁrm-years) on 483,869 ﬁrms from 27 two-digit manufacturing industries
over the period 2000–2007. A brief description of the cleaned CASIF sample is given in
table 1. The number of ﬁrms in our sample increases by 140% over the sample period
and the number of exporters by nearly 130%. Even more remarkably, output increased
by over 300% and export value by over 400% in real terms. Note that because the
sample excludes smaller ﬁrms, some of the apparent increase in the number of ﬁrms
may be caused by ﬁrms crossing the sampling threshold of 5-million-RMB annual sales
either from being smaller ﬁrms or due to inﬂation. However, In Appendix B we use
information on ﬁrms’ age and the First National Economic Census data of 2004 to
establish how much of this entry is genuine. We show that the identiﬁcation of “new
exporting ﬁrms” is very unlikely to be misleading: the likelihood for the identiﬁcation
to be correct is 98.3% on a year-to-year basis, or 88.7% on an eight-year basis.






Output (bn RMB) Exports (bn RMB)
Nominal Real Nominal Real
2000 113,590 27,864 6,135.8 6,135.8 1,118.5 1,118.5
2001 117,085 29,392 6,646.4 6,750.5 1,158.7 1,180.7
2002 124,478 32,553 7,858.6 8,182.3 1,502.9 1,579.6
2003 138,262 36,800 10,259.6 10,572.4 2,059.9 2,182.4
2004 202,007 56,002 13,836.2 13,522.7 2,915.6 3,021.4
2005 204,965 57,852 17,747.1 16,814.6 3,735.0 3,843.8
2006 232,842 61,552 22,312.3 20,870.9 4,704.4 4,849.2
2007 271,705 63,648 29,798.1 26,878.7 5,693.5 5,825.9
Note: Real terms are in 2000 prices. See Appendix A.3 for more details on the construction of the
deﬂators.
For some of our analysis we will use a balanced panel of ﬁrms. Largely because of the
extraordinarily high entry rate of ﬁrms, the balanced panel is much smaller: only 14%
of ﬁrms in the sample in 2000 are still in the sample in 2007, and only 6% of ﬁrms in
the sample in 2007 were also in the sample in 2000. Basic sample statistics are shown
in table 2.






Output (bn RMB) Exports (bn RMB)
Nominal Real Nominal Real
2000 16,205 4,980 1,341.2 1,341.2 239.8 239.8
2001 16,205 5,083 1,521.7 1,549.0 260.8 266.0
2002 16,205 5,250 1,766.4 1,844.3 318.3 334.9
2003 16,205 5,313 2,162.0 2,242.7 387.5 410.7
2004 16,205 5,608 2,541.6 2,493.4 494.0 510.9
2005 16,205 5,668 3,120.2 2,971.2 596.7 609.8
2006 16,205 5,604 3,668.2 3,472.5 727.2 740.1
2007 16,205 5,230 4,356.7 3,982.7 831.5 837.0
Note: Real terms are in 2000 prices. See Appendix A.3 for more details on the construction of the
deﬂators.
In the balanced panel the growth of the number of exporting ﬁrms is much lower
(5% compared to 128% in the full sample), suggesting that ﬁrm entry is particularly
important in explaining export growth. We investigate this in more detail in Section 4.
But even in the balanced panel there is still a 200% increase in real output and a 250%
increase in real export values.
Figure 1 illustrates the export boom from oﬃcial statistics5 and compares with the
cleaned ﬁrm-level data (cleaned sample) and the customs trade data.6 The oﬃcial
statistics and the customs statistics are almost the same because the former is from
the latter and thus should be identical. The tiny gap between the two statistics is
due to the small diﬀerence in the classiﬁcation of manufactured goods.7 The growth of
exports in our full sample follows the growth in oﬃcial statistics quite closely, typically
representing about 70% of oﬃcially recorded total exports. As noted earlier, the growth
in export values in the balanced panel is much smaller.
5See China Statistical Yearbooks published annually by National Bureau of Statistics of China.
6Here we extract manufactures exports from the original customs data, which is described later,
by HS2002-ISIC Rev.3.1 concordance table downloadable from the United Nations website (http:
//unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regdnld.asp?Lg=1). These export values are then converted
from USD to RMB in the year 2000 price.
7The Chinese statistical oﬃce identiﬁes manufactures in customs trade using its own criterion which
is not available to us, while we use, as was mentioned before, the concordance table from the United

























































2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
year
Official statistics Full sample
Balanced panel Customs statistics
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks and authors’ calculation.
Fig 1. Export Values
2.2 Trade data
The second major data source is the database of Chinese Customs Trade Statistics
(CCTS) which is compiled and maintained by the General Administration of Customs
of China. It records monthly all merchandise transactions passing through Chinese
customs from 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2006, containing information on ﬁrm
basic information (name, address, ownership, etc.), product code, value of imports and
exports, quantity of goods, customs regimes, means of transportation, customs code,
origin and destination country. We collapse the data to yearly frequency for consistency
with the ﬁrm-level data.8
The product codes of traded goods are 8-digit Harmonized Commodity Description and
Coding System (HS) codes. The export and import values are reported as free on board
(FOB) values in $US. The corresponding quantity of goods are also reported in various
units depending on the nature of goods (for example, kilograms, sets, pairs, meters,
square meters, etc.). Each transaction is also classiﬁed under one of 18 customs regimes,
which enables us to identify whether a transaction is, for example, for the purpose of
processing trade or not. This enables us to distinguish imported intermediates from
other imports.9
8Both the ﬁrm survey and the customs data record information from the 1 January to 31 December
of the year.
9Table A3 in Appendix A.5 deﬁnes each regime in detail.
8Because our ﬁrm data covers only the manufacturing sector, we drop service trade from
the original CCTS data.10 Table 3 summarises the remaining manufacturing trade data
from the CCTS. Over this period imports grew by 91%, while exports grew by 120%.
The growth in trade is greater than either the growth in the number of transactions
and the number of ﬁrms registered with customs.



















2003 16,613,175 124,263 411.8 437.5 3,496.7 3,541.1
2004 19,697,828 153,602 559.3 592.5 4,776.3 4,558.8
2005 22,812,443 179,317 658.1 760.0 6,066.4 5,519.6
2006 25,658,033 208,017 788.3 966.4 7,553.3 6,672.4
?Converted from USD to RMB using average exchange rate of each year.
?Converted from USD to RMB using average exchange rate of each year and deﬂated to the year 2000 prices by
the ex-factory price index.
Among the 18 customs regimes, three stand out in terms of trade value. These are
“ordinary trade”, “processing and assembly trade”, and “processing with imported
materials trade”. Under the second of these regimes foreign suppliers provide raw ma-
terials, parts or components for subsequent re-export, and these inputs remain property
of the foreign supplier. The ﬁnal regime diﬀers in that the inputs are the property of
the exporting ﬁrm. Table 4 shows that such processing accounts for around 40% of all
imports and 50% of all exports. However, these shares have remained quite stable over
the limited period of the customs data.
2.3 Matched ﬁrm-transaction data
Merging the two datasets described above allows us to link ﬁrm production with ﬁrm
trade. We can then examine, for example, the contribution of imported intermediates
to total exports and the skill intensity of exports. The ﬁrm- and trade- data do not use
consistent ﬁrm identiﬁcation numbers, so we use ﬁrm name as the matching criteria.
Firm name is a reliable match variable as it is ruled that no ﬁrms can have the same
10See Appendix A.5 for further details.







2003 45.58 9.30 30.05 15.06
2004 44.25 9.42 30.01 16.32
2005 42.41 10.01 31.42 16.17







2003 41.47 12.39 42.83 3.31
2004 40.98 11.56 43.80 3.66
2005 41.25 11.03 43.74 3.99
2006 42.90 9.76 42.96 4.38
name in the same administrative region and given that virtually all ﬁrms contain their
local region name as part of their ﬁrm name. About 50% of the exporting ﬁrms in the
cleaned CASIF data are ﬁnally matched to the customs trade records and they account
for 60% of exports recorded in the cleaned CASIF data.11 The remaining 50% of the
exporting ﬁrms do not get matched because they are believed to export via trading
agents and therefore do not appear in the customs records. The sample of matched
ﬁrms is summarised in Table 5.
Three points are worth noting. First, there are gaps between the number of ﬁrms and
the number of exporters in Table 5. For example in 2003, there are 22,787 ﬁrms in the
CASIF data appearing in the matched sample, but only 16,972 of them are exporters.
The reason is that some ﬁrms are importers and do not export anything in some years.
These importers account for about one-fourth of all matched ﬁrms.
Second, normally each ﬁrm in the matched sample should have a unique ﬁrm code and a
unique customs registration code. But Table 5 shows the number of customs-registered
ﬁrms is slightly less than that of ﬁrms identiﬁed by ﬁrm codes in the CASIF data,


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































11implying that some customs registration codes correspond to multiple ﬁrm codes. This
could happen if some ﬁrms changed their ﬁrm codes in the CASIF data (for example
because of ownership changes or simply misinput) but did not change their registration
code in the the customs data. However, such cases are very rare and are unlikely to
have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on our analysis.
Second, we have two diﬀerent measures of exports from the two data sets, in diﬀerent
currency units. After we convert USD into RMB using yearly average exchange rate, we
ﬁnd that exports from the CASIF data are consistently 10%-25% higher than exports
from the CCTS data. Apart from inaccuracy of using yearly average exchange rates
instead of actual exchange rates for each transaction, the most likely explanation of this
discrepancy is that some of the matched ﬁrms export products themselves, and at the
same time export through trading agents. While the goods exported through trading
agents are counted as part of the production ﬁrms’ exports in the CASIF data, they
are recorded under the name of the trading agents in the CCTS data.
3 Preliminary Evidence
In this section we brieﬂy document the export boom from an aggregate perspective,
focussing on industry, geographic location and ownership. Chinese export shares have
moved strongly away from traditional labour-intensive industries such as textiles and
clothing, towards capital- and skill-intensive industries such as electronic equipment.
This is shown in Table 6, where the shares of export value are calculated for each two-
digit industry. The increase in the share of electronics amngst all exports dwarfs any
of the other sectors — this industry alone now accounts for 35% of all Chines exports.
This is consistent with the ﬁndings in the recent literature such as Amiti and Freund
(2010).
Figures 2 and 3 show how the proportion of exporting ﬁrms and the value of exports has
evolved over the sample period, split by geographic location and ownership. Figure 2
shows that exporting ﬁrms are most likely to be found in Coastal regions,12 and that
12The Coastal regions include the provincial-level administrative regions of Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei,
Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, and Hainan. Although strictly
speaking Beijing is not a coastal region but it is included here because it is the capital city and one of
12Table 6. Reshuﬄing in the Industrial Structure of
Export Value (%)
Industry 2000 2007 Change
Textiles 12.36 6.04 −6.32
Clothing 8.44 4.80 −3.64
Leather/fur/feather 5.71 3.17 −2.54
Oﬃce equipments 3.05 1.83 −1.22
Processing of foods 3.30 2.33 −0.97
Plastics 3.06 2.43 −0.63
Petroleum/coking 1.05 0.44 −0.61
Metal products 4.47 3.88 −0.59
Medicines 1.43 0.93 −0.50
Raw chemical material 3.95 3.63 −0.32
Manufacturing of foods 0.87 0.76 −0.11
Measuring instruments 2.72 2.63 −0.09
Beverages 0.37 0.29 −0.08
Non-ferrous metals 1.76 1.72 −0.04
Paper products 0.87 0.80 −0.07
Rubber 1.35 1.28 −0.07
General machinery 3.52 3.47 −0.05
Non-metallic minerals 2.21 2.13 −0.08
Printing 0.23 0.32 0.09
Chemical ﬁbers 0.27 0.36 0.09
Timber/wood 0.64 0.88 0.24
Furniture 1.08 1.43 0.35
Special machinery 1.23 1.74 0.51
Ferrous metals 2.74 3.96 1.22
Transport equipments 3.90 5.15 1.25
Electrical equipments 6.38 8.19 1.81
Electronic equipments 23.06 35.42 12.36
Note: The industries are arranged in ascending order of percentage
change in export value share.
13foreign-owned ﬁrms13 are more likely to be exporters.14 However, within all categories
the proportion of exporting ﬁrms is quite stable. From Table 1, we can see that the
growth in the total number of ﬁrms has approximately equalled the growth in the



















































Fig 2. Proportion of exporting ﬁrms across ownership types and
regions
Figure 3 shows that the increase in export value has been dominated by ﬁrms in coastal
regions. Within coastal regions, only state-owned ﬁrms experienced no dramatic in-
crease in export values. The largest increase came from foreign-owned ﬁrms, with
average annual growth of more than 35%. The export expansion of ﬁrms located in
coastal regions further strengthened the role of these regions, which in 2007 accounted
for 93% of China’s manufacturing exports.
There are two main reasons for the inferior export performance of state-owned ﬁrms.
The ﬁrst is the government-directed reform which closed or merged a large number of
the major economic centres in China.
13Foreign-owned ﬁrms are deﬁned as ﬁrms with foreign share of paid-in capital higher than 50%.
14The superior export performance either in terms of participation rate or in terms of export intensity
by foreign ﬁrms have been documented in some empirical studies, including Bernard and Jensen (2004b)
on the U.S. ﬁrms sample and Kneller et al. (2008) on the U.K. ﬁrms sample. Zhang and Song (2001)
and Zhang and Felmingham (2001) ﬁnd that foreign ﬁrms in China are also more intensively engaged



























































Fig 3. Export Values across ownership types and regions
the state-owned ﬁrms in order to enhance their eﬃciency and make the market more
open to other participants. Second, the relatively low eﬃciency of state-owned ﬁrms
signiﬁcantly accelerated their exit rate in an increasingly competitive market. At the
same time, industrial policies introduced and implemented by the central government
encouraged more foreign investment and domestic non-state ﬁrms to enter into the
market, driving out less eﬃcient ﬁrms. These factors collectively lead to the rapid
reduction in the market and export share of state-owned ﬁrms.
4 A Decomposition of Chinese Export Growth
Firm entry, exit, growth, and changes in export intensity within ﬁrms can all contribute
to the aggregate growth of exports. This ties in closely with the theoretical literature
which suggests the importance of ﬁxed entry costs to exporting (see, for example, Melitz
(2003), Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and Bernard et al. (2007)). Evidence from a large
number of empirical works have conﬁrmed the role of sunk costs (see, for example,
Roberts and Tybout (1997), Aw et al. (2000), Aw et al. (2001), and Bernard and
Jensen (2004a,b)), and have also documented the positive eﬀect of trade liberalization
on aggregate industry productivity by reallocation of resources from less eﬃcient ﬁrms
to more eﬃcient ﬁrms (see, for example, Pavcnik (2002), Eslava et al. (2004), and
Amiti and Konings (2007)). However, the main focus of most of these papers is on
15productivity rather than the sources of export growth. One exception is Bernard and
Jensen (2004b) which decomposes the U.S. export boom from 1987-1992 into ﬁrm entry,
ﬁrm expansion, and export intensity. One of their key ﬁndings is that ﬁrm entry plays
a relatively smaller role than export intensity and this lends support to the importance
of sunk entry costs in the export market. With the Chinese customs trade data, Amiti
and Freund (2010) recently examined the issue of Chinese export growth in terms of
product variety change, but had no discussion of the role of ﬁrm dynamics. This is
implausible with the customs trade data as it contains little information of the ﬁrm
activities.
There are at least two reasons why the Chinese boom might provide a diﬀerent setting
for the decomposition of export growth. First, because of WTO accession, China under-
went a much deeper liberalisation in the sample period than the U.S. from 1987–1992,
where the main external drive was Dollar depreciation (Bernard and Jensen, 2004a).
Second, as Table 4 showed, half of all Chinese exports are via processing and assembly
trade regimes. It seems likely that the role of ﬁrm entry and growth is quite diﬀerent
for exports which form part of a global production chain.
Our decomposition contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, we propose
a simple decomposition method which provides direct quantitative measurements of the
contributions from ﬁrm net entry (ﬁrm entry net of ﬁrm exit) and ﬁrm export expansion
in the export market. The former refers to the extensive margin while the latter refers
to the intensive margin. This deﬁnition of the two margins stems from some recent work
such as Helpman et al. (2008) which models the impact of international trade frictions
on trade ﬂows as being of two sources: trade volume per exporter (intensive margins)
and number of exporters (extensive margins).15 On the other hand, our decomposition
method also relates to the empirical work by Bernard and Jensen (2004a). To obtain
the relative contributions of ﬁrm entry, ﬁrm expansion, and export intensity change,
Bernard and Jensen decompose export growth into growth eﬀect (shipment growth)
and intensity eﬀect (change in proportion of exports in shipments) and then compare
the results for export starters, export stoppers, and continuing exports. While their
approach is focused more on ﬁrm entry/exit dynamics, our method oﬀers a simple,
15Helpman et al. (2008) also conduct empirical estimates of the two margins but their estimation
equations are derived from their model and thus highly structural.
16convenient tool that serves the purpose of simply comparing intensive margins and
extensive margins.
Second, the decomposition method is applied ﬂexibly from diﬀerent angles through-
out our thorough investigation of the sources of export growth. We study the export
growth in general and also look into diﬀerent ﬁrm ownership types and diﬀerent indus-
tries. Our unique micro data also allows us to have a detailed analysis of the roles of
ﬁrms with diﬀerent technology levels. This could help us understand the technology
level of Chinese exports better and adds value to the current debate on the technological
sophistication of Chinese exports. Another important issue is change in product variety
versus product value. An emerging literature has emphasised the importance of exten-
sive margins and intensive margins at the product level in explaining trade growth and
has provided supporting evidence, mainly including studies of the U.S. (Bernard et al.,
2009a,b, 2010), study of India (Goldberg et al., 2010), and study of China (Manova
and Zhang, 2009). Our within-ﬁrm product-level decomposition is in line with this
literature but adds new evidence on the change in product varieties within ﬁrms, by
which we can see how ﬁrms adjusted their number of product varieties exported and
how this contributed to the overall export growth.
4.1 Basic decomposition
Deﬁne 𝐸𝑡 as aggregate real export value, ¯ 𝐸𝑡 as the mean export value of exporting
ﬁrms, and 𝑁𝐸
𝑡 as the total number of exporting ﬁrms at time 𝑡. Since 𝐸𝑡 = ¯ 𝐸𝑡𝑁𝐸
𝑡 , it
follows that
Δ𝐸𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡−1 = 𝑁
𝐸
𝑡 Δ ¯ 𝐸𝑡 + ¯ 𝐸𝑡−1Δ𝑁
𝐸
𝑡 . (1)
Alternatively, we can also write




𝑡−1Δ ¯ 𝐸𝑡. (2)
















The ﬁrst term of the right hand side of (3) is a measure of the intensive margin of export
growth, the share of export growth arising from the growth in exports per exporting
17ﬁrm. The second term is deﬁned as the extensive margin of export growth, the share
of export growth due to the increase in the number of exporting ﬁrms.
The ﬁrst column of Table 7 presents the results of decomposition (3), expressed as a
percentage of the total export value growth. In the whole sample, the intensive and
extensive margin are equally important: exactly half of export growth was from ex-
porting ﬁrms increasing their exports, and half was from the net eﬀect of ﬁrms entering
and exiting the export market. As we examine in Appendix B, about 11.3% of the
identiﬁed “new” exporting ﬁrms may in fact be existing exporting ﬁrms which cross the
size threshold. Therefore we are overestimating to some extent the role of the extensive
margin.
However, even allowing for this overestimation, the contribution of the extensive margin
is much higher than found for other countries. For example, in a study of U.S. export
growth from 1987 to 1992, Bernard and Jensen (2004a) ﬁnd that only 13% of the
growth is attributed to the net entry of ﬁrms into the export market. Bernard and
Jensen take this ﬁnding as evidence of the importance of sunk costs in ﬁrms’ decisions
to export. While the relatively small role of the extensive margin is seen as a reﬂection
of the existence of ﬁxed export costs, the role will be larger if the ﬁxed export costs are
reduced over time. In the heterogeneous ﬁrm models, this happens because decreasing
ﬁxed export costs reduces the productivity cutoﬀ for ﬁrm entry into the export market.
When ﬁxed export costs are lower, some of the ﬁrms that were not productive enough
to export are now able to do so because they are now capable of overcoming the reduced
ﬁxed costs. In the Chinese setting, where trade costs have presumably reduced more
dramatically than in the U.S. case of Bernard and Jensen (2004a), the role of the
extensive margin is expected to be much larger, as is found here.
The second column of Table 7 repeats decomposition (3) for the balanced panel only.
The extensive margin is reduced dramatically because it now comprises only ﬁrms in
the sample in every year which enter the export market at some point. The huge gap
in the extensive margin between the two samples shows that most of the extensive
margin is from new ﬁrms rather than from pre-existing non-exporting ﬁrms entering
into the export market. This ﬁnding is quite interesting and urges us to rethink about
the division of market selection in the heterogeneous ﬁrm models. The key reason why
18Table 7. Sources of the Growth in Export Value
Full sample Balanced panel
Export value (2000) 1118.5 239.8
Export value (2007) 5825.8 837.0
Change (2000/2007) 4707.3 597.2
Intensive margin 0.500 (50.0%) 0.956 (95.6%)
Extensive margin 0.500 (50.0%) 0.044 (4.4%)
Note: Export values and their change are measured in billion RMB in
2000 prices. Numbers in parentheses are shares of intensive margin or
extensive margin within each group.
ﬁrms have to be more productive to export than to sell products domestically is that
exporting requires additional ﬁxed costs. However, if ﬁxed costs associated with being
a domestic ﬁrm were higher than being an exporting ﬁrm, then the above prediction
would be reversed: it would be easier to export than to sell products domestically.
In reality, this could happen when there exists relatively huge ﬁxed costs with doing
business in the domestic market compared to exporting, especially when export costs
are reduced to a suﬃciently low level. This explanation is supported by many empirical
studies which ﬁnd large interregional trade costs in China (Amiti and Javorcik, 2008;
Bai et al., 2004; Poncet, 2003, 2005; Young, 2000).
4.2 Export growth by ﬁrm type and industry
We can shed some light on the remarkably large share of new ﬁrms in the growth
of Chinese exports by repeating the decomposition for various diﬀerent types of ﬁrm.
If we have 𝑗 = 1,...,𝐽 mutually exclusive types of ﬁrm (for example foreign- and
domestically-owned ﬁrms), then decomposition 3 can be calculated for each type of












Δ ¯ 𝐸𝑗𝑡 +





which allows us to compute and compare the contribution of ﬁrms of each type to the
intensive and extensive margins.
We categories ﬁrms according to: ownership (domestic, foreign or state-owned); location
(coastal or inland) and trade regime (ordinary or processing trade). We expect that
19some of these ﬁrm types will face much lower entry costs, and will therefore have a
larger contribution from the extensive margin. For example, foreign-owned ﬁrms or
ﬁrms which are merely assembling imported materials for re-export may be able to set
up new plants and start exporting within a short space of time, compared to traditional
domestically-owned ﬁrms which are exporting products developed in China.
Table 8 summarises the results of these decompositions by ﬁrm type. The top panel
separates ﬁrms into four main ownership types. This shows that although foreign-owned
ﬁrms were responsible for nearly half of the total export growth (0.211 + 0.269), the
importance of the extensive margin does not vary greatly across the three non-state
ﬁrm types. In fact, domestically-owned private ﬁrms have a slightly higher extensive
margin than foreign-owned ﬁrms.
The second panel of Table 8 decomposes export growth by ﬁrm location. This shows
that over 90% of the export value growth came from exporting ﬁrms located in the
coastal region. In addition, the coastal region had a higher proportion of export growth
from the extensive margin, consistent with the idea that export entry costs are lower
for ﬁrms located in coastal regions. It might also reﬂect other characteristics of ﬁrms
which are located in these regions.
The third panel of Table 8 decomposes export growth by customs regime. In order
to identify the trade regime used by each ﬁrm, we turn to the matched ﬁrm-product
sample. The three most important regimes are given in Table 4, namely: ordinary trade,
processing and assembling, processing with imported materials. We deﬁne an exporting
ﬁrm as using a particular customs regime if its exports of that regime contribute more
than 50% of its total exports.
Processing ﬁrms account for almost all (97%) of the export growth (0.199 + 0.053 +
0.647+0.070), and the extensive margin is particularly important for these ﬁrms com-
pared to other ﬁrm types. Note that almost all this growth is from ﬁrms which import
materials independently (processing with imported materials) rather than simply en-
gaging in assembly work for foreign companies (processing and assembling).
A further possible explanation for the very high extensive margin is the industrial
composition of export growth. Table 9 reports the decomposition for each industry, or-














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































21growth in exports, contributing 45% (0.236 + 0.2195). Other important industries are
electrical equipment (8.5%), transport equipment (6.1%) and textiles (4.1%). However,
apart from textiles, none of these industries has a particularly high extensive margin.
There does appear to be a higher extensive margin in more labour-intensive industries,
which is consistent with the idea that these industries have lower entry costs. There
were also some signiﬁcant reductions in trade barriers in textile and clothing industries
as a result of the termination of the MFA quota restrictions in 2005.16
4.3 Export growth by ﬁrm technology level
A key aim of this paper is to examine whether Chinese exports became more technolog-
ically sophisticated over this period. Here technology sophistication refers to the level
of technology used in production. Apart from rapid volume growth, a major concern
with Chinese exports is that its technology level might be increasing fast, imposing
higher pressure on high-income countries’ producers. Some widely cited studies pay
special attention to this issue, and ﬁnd that the product composition of Chinese ex-
ports have been similar to higher-income countries more than China’s real income per
capita would imply (Rodrik, 2006; Schott, 2008). While we will look into this question
more formally and more carefully in Section 6, here we just have a brief discussion of it
in terms of ﬁrm dynamics. By having a picture of how ﬁrms with diﬀerent technology
levels had their shares in total exports changed over time, the analysis is expected to
provide some evidence of the degree of technological improvement in Chinese exports.
Again, we apply the decomposition method used before. An advantage of our ﬁrm-
level data is that it contains detailed technology information related to, for example,
workers’ educations, skills, R&D investment, and so on. However, these measures are
only available in one year of the sample period. We therefore restrict our sample to the
balanced panel and make the assumption that individual ﬁrms’ technology levels are
constant over time. To some extent therefore we will underestimate any changes in the
technological content of exports because we ignore this within-ﬁrm component.
16There were some cases of reimposition of quantity restrictions on imports of Chinese textile prod-
ucts after 2005, for example those in the U.S., the E.U., and South Africa. But generally speaking,
the new quotas were temporary and were negotiated to increase gradually until being completely
eliminated.
















Leather/fur/feather 63.8 168.4 104.5 0.0038 0.0184 17.3% 82.7%
Non-metallic minerals 24.7 67.5 42.7 0.0018 0.0073 19.6% 80.4%
Plastics 34.2 120.2 86.0 0.0037 0.0146 20.3% 79.7%
Metal products 50.0 166.0 116.0 0.0053 0.0193 21.7% 78.3%
Textiles 138.2 333.1 194.9 0.0117 0.0297 28.3% 71.7%
Furniture 12.1 79.9 67.8 0.0042 0.0102 29.2% 70.8%
Clothing 94.5 270.5 176.0 0.0131 0.0243 35.1% 64.9%
Oﬃce equipments 34.1 107.7 73.6 0.0055 0.0101 35.4% 64.6%
Non-ferrous metals 19.7 54.6 34.9 0.0029 0.0045 38.8% 61.2%
Timber/wood 7.2 46.7 39.5 0.0033 0.0051 39.4% 60.6%
Electrical equipments 71.3 470.0 398.6 0.0358 0.0488 42.3% 57.7%
Printing 2.6 19.5 16.9 0.0016 0.0020 43.5% 56.5%
Processing of foods 36.9 107.4 70.5 0.0065 0.0085 43.6% 56.4%
Rubber 15.1 60.5 45.4 0.0042 0.0054 43.9% 56.1%
General machinery 39.4 218.1 178.8 0.0172 0.0208 45.2% 54.8%
Transport equipments 43.6 330.2 286.5 0.0296 0.0312 48.7% 51.3%
Special machinery 13.7 108.4 94.7 0.0099 0.0102 49.2% 50.8%
Electronic equipments 257.9 2402.2 2144.3 0.2360 0.2195 51.8% 48.2%
Measuring instruments 30.4 171.0 140.6 0.0160 0.0139 53.6% 46.4%
Raw chemical materials 44.2 178.0 133.8 0.0156 0.0128 55.1% 44.9%
Chemical ﬁbers 3.0 17.7 14.7 0.0018 0.0013 58.2% 41.8%
Manufacturing of foods 9.7 38.3 28.6 0.0035 0.0025 58.3% 41.7%
Paper products 9.8 45.3 35.5 0.0046 0.0029 61.4% 38.6%
Medicines 16.0 47.1 31.1 0.0043 0.0023 64.8% 35.2%
Ferrous metals 30.6 169.7 139.1 0.0192 0.0104 64.9% 35.1%
Beverages 4.1 14.8 10.7 0.0016 0.0006 71.7% 28.3%
Petroleum/coking 11.7 13.3 1.5 0.0003 0.0000 100.0% 0.0%
Note: Export values and their change are measured in billion RMB in 2000 price. The industries are arranged in
ascending order of the share of intensive margin.
23We label two groups of ﬁrms within each industry. High technology ﬁrms are those
in the top quartile within their industry for a particular technology measure. Low
technology ﬁrms are those in the bottom quartile. We use six measures of technological
sophistication, deﬁned below.
1. Education is deﬁned as the proportion of workers with higher-education degrees
in 2004.17
2. Skill is deﬁned as the proportion of workers with technical in 2004. They are usu-
ally those people whose jobs are related to research, product design, maintenance
and repair of sophisticated machines, or other special skills.
3. Computer is deﬁned as the number of computers used per worker in 2004.
4. R&D intensity is deﬁned as the ratio of R&D expenditure to the ﬁnal value of
output. The value of this index represents how much value of R&D is invested to
produce one monetary unit of output in a given industry.
5. Worker-training is measured as expenditure per worker on worker training in
2004.18.
6. New product intensity is measured as the ratio of new product value over output
in 2004. In the CASIF data, new product value is deﬁned as value of output of
those products made by new technology, or with new product designs, structural
improvements, new materials, and so on.
17One practical reason why education intensity is measured this way is that China has a compulsory
education law which rules that normally each citizen must receive at least nine years’ school education.
As a result, almost all workers have achieved the legally required compulsory education and therefore
the variation in schooling only exists in education beyond the junior middle school level. Senior
middle school education (including some vocational training education) is also very common and have
almost become a prerequisite in any formal job market. However, many labour-intensive positions
still do not necessarily require workers to have had higher-education degrees. Because of this, there
is suﬃcient variation in the proportion of workers with higher-education degrees, which makes this
measure eﬀective as an proxy for education intensity.
18Although this is a ﬂow measure, it captures the cross-ﬁrm diﬀerences in human capital if ﬁrms
with high human capital intensity train their workers more than other ﬁrms in a given industry. It is
similar to the measure of R&D intensity above
24The resulting decompositions are given in Table 10. Firms in the top quartile of tech-
nological sophistication almost always contribute a larger share of export growth, in
some cases dramatically so. For example, ﬁrms with highly educated workers con-
tribute more than half of all export growth and ﬁrms which are in the top quartile
of worker training contribute more than 60% of all export growth. Because all of the
technology measures are constructed with each industry, cross-industry diﬀerences are
excluded here. Therefore it is clear that ﬁrms with higher technology levels expanded
their export market shares over time, crowding out technologically inferior ﬁrms. We
see this as new evidence of increasing technology content of Chinese exports. Diﬀerent
from those studies which ﬁnd increasing similarity of the Chinese export product mix
to developed countries (Rodrik, 2006; Schott, 2008), our result here provides the direct
evidence of the within-industry technological improvement in Chinese export activities.
Table 10 also shows that, in every case, the extensive margin is either zero or negative
for low technology ﬁrms (indicating net exit of low technology ﬁrms from the export
market), but is always positive for high technology ﬁrms.19 This suggests that the large
number of new exporting ﬁrms are predominantly high technology ﬁrms.
4.4 Sources of export growth at the product level
Because we also have product-level data on exports from the CCTS, we can further
decompose exports into an intensive and extensive margin at the product level. The
importance of the adjustment of trade at the product margin has been recognised by
an emerging body of literature (e.g., Bernard et al., 2009a,b, 2010; Goldberg et al.,
2010; Manova and Zhang, 2009; Amiti and Freund, 2010). Adjustment at the prod-
uct margin result in changes in product varieties. The primary reason why changes in
product varieties matter is similar to ﬁrm entry/exit in the export market: introducing
a new product incurs ﬁxed costs. In the models of Bernard et al. (2009b, 2010), the
ﬁxed costs of exporting a product lead to ﬁrm selection in the product-market par-
ticipation, analogous to ﬁrm selection in the export market in the heterogeneous ﬁrm
models. Compared to these existing studies, we employ a relatively simpler version of
decomposition method as used before to examine two speciﬁc margins of export growth:
19Note that the extensive margins reported in Table 10 are much smaller because these results come
from the balanced panel.















Education ≥ 75% pctl. 31.2% 47.6% 54.1% 91.2% 8.8%
Education ≤ 25% pctl. 14.2% 9.9% 8.2% 102.7% -2.7%
Skill ≥ 75% pctl. 21.8% 34.7% 39.9% 96.0% 4.0%
Skill ≤ 25% pctl. 34.3% 25.7% 22.2% 99.0% 1.0%
Computer ≥ 75% pctl. 39.4% 54.7% 39.9% 91.5% 8.5%
Computer ≤ 25% pctl. 15.9% 12.2% 22.2% 106.0% -6.0%
R&D intensity ≥ 50% pctl. 16.1% 30.2% 35.9% 85.4% 14.6%
No R&D expenditure 49.2% 34.4% 28.5% 102.2% -2.2%
Worker-training ≥ 50% pctl. 38.9% 55.6% 62.3% 92.8% 7.2%
No worker-training 18.8% 11.8% 9.0% 100.9% -0.9%
New product intensity ≥ 50% pctl. 16.9% 22.1% 24.4% 81.9% 18.1%
No new products 53.7% 33.6% 25.5% 102.0% -2.0%
Note: The second and the third columns are the shares of diﬀerent technology groups in the total export
value of each year. The fourth column is the share of export value growth of diﬀerent technology groups in
total export value growth. The last two columns break down the fourth column into the intensive margin
and the extensive margin.
change in export value per variety (intensive margin) and changes in the product va-
rieties per exporting ﬁrm. Albeit simple in form, our decomposition, as will be seen
below, provides within-ﬁrm changes in export product varieties, which will be helpful
in understanding ﬁrm export behaviour in terms of export variety choice.
¯ 𝐸𝑡 can be expressed as the product of two components for the sample of exporting
ﬁrms:
¯ 𝐸𝑡 =
¯ 𝑒𝑡 × ?𝑡
𝑁𝐸
𝑡
≡ ¯ 𝑒𝑡 × 𝑣𝑡, (5)
where ¯ 𝑒𝑡 is the mean export value of each product variety, ?𝑡 is the number of product
varieties, 𝑁𝐸
𝑡 is the number of exporting ﬁrms, and 𝑣𝑡 is the number of product varieties
per exporting ﬁrm, deﬁned as ?𝑡/𝑁𝐸
𝑡 . Then the intensive and extensive contributions
26to Δ ¯ 𝐸𝑡 can be written as




¯ 𝑒𝑡−1 + ¯ 𝑒𝑡
2
Δ𝑣𝑡. (6)
The intensive margin (¯ 𝑒) here represents the export value per product and the exten-
sive margin (𝑣) represents the number of products exported per exporting ﬁrm. The
decomposition of Δ ¯ 𝐸 are in table 11. We apply the decomposition both to the full
CCTS sample and the matched CASIF-CCTS sample. The results are similar. The
intensive margin is large and positive, while the extensive margin is large and negative.
This shows that the growth in export value per ﬁrm was not driven by new products;
indeed the number of products per exporting ﬁrm decreased over this period. The num-
ber of ﬁrms entering into the export market was far more than the growth of product
categories and this consequently lead to an increasing export volume per product and
a decreasing number of products per exporting ﬁrm. One the one hand, the result here
is consistent with ﬁndings in other studies on China that variety growth plays a small
part in China’s export expansion (Manova and Zhang, 2009; Amiti and Freund, 2010).
On the other hand, the result reveals a new channel of export growth, which is how
product varieties are adjusted within ﬁrms. Once again, this conﬁrms that new ﬁrms
starting to export was a key driving force of Chinese export growth.
Table 11. Sources of Growth in the Mean Export Value ¯ 𝐸
Full CCTS Matched sample
¯ 𝐸2003 4,575,147.4 6,200,965.5
¯ 𝐸2006 5,661,913.7 7,637,733.1
Δ ¯ 𝐸 = ¯ 𝐸2006 − ¯ 𝐸2003 1,086,766.3 1,436,767.6
Intensive margin (Δ¯ 𝑒) 3.840 (384.0%) 3.961 (396.1%)
Extensive margin (Δ𝑣) -2.840 (-284.0%) -2.961 (-296.1%)
Note: ¯ 𝐸𝐸
𝑡 = ¯ ?𝑡×𝑛𝑡
𝑁𝐸
𝑡
≡ ¯ 𝑒𝑡 × 𝑣𝑡.
4.5 The role of export policy zones
Using the CCTS trade data, Wang and Wei (2010) reveal the positive eﬀect of policy
zones in China’s export growth in a regression framework. However, very little is known
about the kinds of ﬁrms which set up in EPZs. Undoubtedly, uncovering the mechanism
27underlying the relationship between export policies, ﬁrm behavior, and export growth,
is a crucial step toward a deeper understanding of China’s export boom. Since the
CCTS data contains information on whether a ﬁrm is located within a policy zone of a
speciﬁc type or not, our matched data makes the above task possible. A simple method
for revealing the role of policy zones is to compare the characteristics of ﬁrms inside
and outside EPZs over time.
We ﬁrst do the comparison for EPZs in table 12. In four years (from 2003 to 2006),
the number of ﬁrms in EPZs more than doubled.20 More interestingly, we ﬁnd that
ﬁrms in EPZs are superior in any of the performances than their counterparts outside
EPZs except in employment. Firms in EPZs produce more, export more, use more
capital and intermediates, and are more productive, but employ less labour. This
reﬂects the fact that ﬁrms are selected into the EPZs based more on their productive
performance rather than on their capacity to increase employment. The 𝑡-test shows
that over time the gap in performance between ﬁrms inside and outside EPZs gets even
more signiﬁcant. Further, when we expand our analysis to all kinds of policy zones, the
result is very similar, as can be seen in table 13. Obviously, policy zones have been an
increasingly more important driving force of China’s export growth either via attracting
more better-performance ﬁrms or via the learning eﬀect of ﬁrms.
5 Measuring the Value-Added of Chinese Exports
An important part of the growth in world trade in recent decades is the results of ver-
tical specialisation. Vertical specialisation refers to the phenomenon of fragmentation
of global production across countries. In the global production network, each country
only engages in certain stages of the whole production process where it has compara-
tive advantages. With the development of global production, cross-border transfer of
materials and goods with this purpose has been playing an increasingly dominant role
in the world trade (Hummels et al., 2001; Yi, 2003; Dean et al., 2008).
Hummels et al. (2001) (HIY hereafter) ﬁrst propose a rigorous measure of vertical
specialisation, before which there have been many case studies and anecdotes spread
20It should be born in mind that trading companies and small ﬁrms, which actually make up a large
proportion of the ﬁrms in EPZs, are not included here because of the matching.
28Table 12. Mean Comparisons of Exporting Firms inside and outside Export
Processing Zones (Matched Sample)
2003 2006
NEPZ? EPZ? 𝑡-test NEPZ? EPZ? 𝑡-test
Number of ﬁrms 16,861 111 n.a. 30,998 286 n.a.
Log(Output) 10.73 11.42 -5.02 10.76 11.33 -5.95
Log(Sales) 10.70 11.45 -5.75 10.73 11.34 -6.63
Log(Exports) 9.75 10.78 -6.55 9.77 10.82 -10.33
Log(Capital) 9.09 9.84 -3.01 8.89 9.55 -6.22
Log(Labour) 5.53 5.41 3.33 5.32 5.27 1.30
Log(Intermediates) 10.40 10.93 -3.59 10.28 10.69 -3.69
Labour Productivity? 0.62 0.63 -2.50 0.54 0.58 -4.86
Note: All monetary variables are in real terms (prices in 2000 as numeraire). 𝑡-test tests the equality
of the means between the two ﬁrm groups.)
?NEPZ: exporting ﬁrms outside Export Processing Zones. EPZ: exporting ﬁrms inside Export
Processing Zones.
?Labour productivity is measured as logarithm of output-labour ratio normalized within each 3-
digit-industry-year cohort.
Table 13. Mean Comparisons of Exporting Firms inside and outside Policy
Zones (Matched Sample)
2003 2006
NPZ? PZ? 𝑡-test NPZ? PZ? 𝑡-test
Number of ﬁrms 15,084 1,888 n.a. 27,868 3,416 n.a.
Log(Output) 10.69 11.08 -13.39 10.72 11.11 -15.89
Log(Sales) 10.66 11.07 -14.32 10.69 11.10 -17.01
Log(Exports) 9.73 9.96 -5.82 9.76 9.93 -5.44
Log(Capital) 9.05 9.44 -10.39 8.85 9.26 -12.66
Log(Labour) 5.54 5.45 5.76 5.32 5.27 5.87
Log(Intermediates) 10.37 10.67 -10.44 10.26 10.54 -10.34
Labour Productivity? 0.61 0.63 -10.24 0.53 0.57 -15.20
Note: All monetary variables are in real terms (prices in 2000 as numeraire). 𝑡-test tests the equality
of the means between the two ﬁrm groups.)
?NPZ: exporting ﬁrms outside policy zones. PZ: exporting ﬁrms inside policy zones.
?Labour productivity is measured as logarithm of output-labour ratio normalized within each
industry-year cohort. Industries are categorized at the 3-digit level.
29widely in the economic and business study literature but none of them has a clear and
tractable conceptual framework. The measure in Hummels et al. (2001) is deﬁned as
the value share of imported intermediates in exports and is thus interpreted as the
“imported input content of exports”. Speciﬁcally, it is constructed by scaling the value







where 𝑀 is imported intermediates, 𝑋 is exports, and 𝑌 is total output. An assump-
tion for the validity of this approach is that imported intermediates are used evenly in
production for domestic sales and for export. But if, for example, imported intermedi-
ates are used much more intensively for exports then the domestic content of exports
will be much lower, and the degree of vertical specialisation much higher.
By applying this measure to ten OECD countries using input/output tables (I/O ta-
bles), their empirical evidence shows that 21% of these countries’ exports can be ac-
counted for by vertical specialisation. Dean et al. (2007) apply this method to China
by making use of the Chinese I/O tables and customs trade data. His result shows that
about 35% of China’s exports could be attributed to imported intermediates in 2002,
and there had been a 6.5 percentage-point increase between 1997 and 2002.
Nevertheless, a problem with the HIY approach is that it assumes that imported in-
puts are used evenly in production for domestic sales and in production for exports. If
imported inputs are used more intensively in production for exports, this approach will
underestimate the degree of vertical specialisation. In the example of China, processing
exports are prevailing and even dominant in some industries and this may result in a
more intensive use of imported materials in processing exports and in production for
normal exports or domestic sales. We have already known from Table 4 that processing
trade plays a dominant role in Chinese exports. It was also clear from Section 4 that
foreign ﬁrms and processing ﬁrms have contributed a large fraction of the growth in
Chinese exports. This suggests an important role for vertical specialisation: Chinese
exporters are possibly a relatively low value-added segment of an international produc-
tion chain. The prevalence of processing trade in China, where ﬁrms import materials
to produce ﬁnal or semi-ﬁnal products to export to original foreign suppliers, highlights
the importance of considering vertical specialisation in China’s trade.
30In view of this problem, Chen et al. (2004) and Koopman et al. (2008) modify the
method of Hummels et al. (2001) by splitting the standard I/O tales into separate tables
for processing trade and other types of productions (productions for ordinary trade and
domestic sales). Combining these new I/O tables with trade data, their calculations
produce a higher degree of vertical specialisation. For example, by Koopman et al.’s
(2008) estimation for the year 2002, China’s share of vertical specialisation is around
50% in general and as high as 80% for some industries.21 These numbers, as opposed
to those in Dean et al. (2007), reﬂect in turn the signiﬁcance of processing exports in
China.22
The purpose of this section is to reveal how much China’s domestic value-added is
contained in its exports. Domestic value-added is the value of exports when the content
of vertical specialisation is subtracted. We modify HIY method of measuring the extent
of vertical specialisation in order to take into account the prevalence of processing trade
in China. Because processing ﬁrms typically import a large fraction of their ﬁnal output,
ignoring this will lead to underestimates of the domestic content of Chinese exports.
Diﬀerent from the conventional approaches which rely on trade statistics and I/O tables
to calculate the vertical specialisation or domestic content, we will go down directly to
the ﬁrm level to see how much a typical ﬁrm imports its intermediates from abroad and
how much it exports. To do this, we will base our analysis on a unique ﬁrm-transaction
level data set which has never been used before. By focusing on pure exporting ﬁrms
which sell all their products abroad, we are able to obtain the ﬁrst micro-level evidence
of how much foreign content is contained in Chinese exports.
We note that all the above works on China (Chen et al., 2004; Koopman et al., 2008)
are basically cross-sectional and their time periods do not cover more recent years after
2002. For China, however, the period under our study, 2000 to 2007, is a time when
China was increasingly more integrated to the world trade and the trade barriers were
21Chen et al.’s (2004) study gets a similar result, however it only focuses on the trade between China
and the United States for 1995.
22In a later study, Dean et al. (2008) extend their previous work by comparing the method using
standard I/O tables and that using separate I/O tables as in Koopman et al. (2008). The latter method
is found to generate a systematically larger degree of vertical specialisation than the former, and more
interestingly, the gap between the two estimates is positively correlated with the share of processing
exports in total exports at the sector level.
31also signiﬁcantly reduced in order to be in accordance with the WTO rules. Over time,
it had been easier not only for foreign goods to be imported into China but also for
Chinese products to be sold in other countries. Therefore a natural result of this change
in trade environment is that China could import more and export more simultaneously
over time, which could have aﬀected the domestic content. Our micro data allows for
exploration of this over-time change.
As a ﬁrst step, we identify two groups of imported intermediates in the trade data:
imported intermediates for processing trade and imported intermediates for ordinary
trade. Figure 4 illustrates the diﬀerent modes of vertical specialisation for ordinary
exports and processing exports, modiﬁed from Hummels (2001, Figure 1). For ordinary
trade (see subﬁgure (a)), the imported intermediates can be partly used in production
for domestic sales and partly used in production for ordinary exports. We identify
imported intermediates in all ordinary imports (for example imports to be used as
capital and consumption goods) by the classiﬁcation of the Broad Economic Categories
(BEC) and its HS concordance (See Appendix A.7 for the details). Then, because we
cannot tell by the data how much proportion of the ordinary imported intermediates
are used in production for domestic sales and how much proportion is used production
for exports, we will in general still have to use their product values. HIY method to
impute the proportion of ordinary imported intermediates in exports.
For processing trade (see subﬁgure (b)), ﬁrms import materials or parts through cus-
toms, and then export through customs after these materials are processed or assembled.
According to the rule in China, all processing imports, classiﬁed either under the regime
of processing and assembling or under the regime of processing with imported materials,
should only be used for the purpose of processing exports. Therefore all processing im-
ports are used as intermediate inputs and all of them are ﬁnally embedded in processing
exports.
Based on the above reasoning, a revised formula for the measure of vertical specialisation
is
𝑉 𝑆NEW = 𝑀
𝑝 +
𝑀𝑜
𝑌 − 𝑋𝑝 ⋅ 𝑋
𝑜. (8)
Here the superscripts ? and ? denote processing trade and ordinary trade respectively.

























Fig 4. Modes of Vertical Specialisation for Ordinary Exports and
Processing Exports
𝑀𝑜/(𝑌 − 𝑋𝑝), gives us the proportion of ordinary imports of intermediates used in
ordinary exports. If 𝑀𝑝 and 𝑋𝑝 were zero, this would be equivalent to 𝑉 𝑆HIY.
To see how it has improved the HIY measurement, we can look at the diﬀerence between
(7) and (8):





















For exporting ﬁrms which sell their products both in the domestic market and in the
foreign market, the ﬁrst term is negative as output value always exceeds or is equal to
export value, and the second term is also non-negative by the same reason. However,
if processing trade is dominant in trade and the value of ordinary trade is close to zero
(both 𝑋𝑜 and 𝑀𝑜 are close to zero), then the whole equation could well be negative
because the second term is now close to zero. This is how the downward biased esti-
mation of 𝑉 𝑆 (or upward biased estimation of 𝐷𝑉 ) caused by the HIY method takes
place.
To make further reﬁnements on these results, a possible correction is to restrict our
33sample to pure exporting ﬁrms which export all their goods abroad. The reason is
straightforward: when these ﬁrms have no products sold in the domestic market, all
their imported intermediates are used in production for exports. In this case, (7) and
(8) collapse to the same equation:
𝑉 𝑆HIY = 𝑉 𝑆NEW = 𝑀
𝑜 + 𝑀
𝑝. (10)
Once the measure of vertical specialisation 𝑉 𝑆NEW is obtained, it is easy to calculate
domestic value-added (domestic content) in exports:
𝐷𝑉 = 𝑋 − 𝑉 𝑆NEW. (11)








However, it needs to be born in mind that the estimate is a lower bound estimate of
foreign content or upper bound estimate of domestic content of exports because it is
not possible to trace back how much foreign intermediates are contained in the ﬁrm’s
domestic inputs.23 Albeit the impossibility to get precise estimate of domestic content
of exports, the micro-level evidence is a valuable supplement to the highly aggregated
sector-level estimates and more importantly, enables us to explore within-ﬁrm variations
such as changes over time and origin/destination variation.
5.1 Estimated domestic content from the matched sample
We apply the above methods to the matched CASIF-CCTS sample. The industry-level
estimates are presented in Table 14. We have two ﬁndings here. First, it is found that
paper products and electronics have the lowest share of domestic value-added in their
23It would be helpful to illustrate this by an example. Suppose a pure exporting ﬁrm has 30 thousand
dollars of intermediates imported from abroad and another 20 thousand dollars of intermediates bought
from the domestic market, and it combines these materials with capital and labour inputs to produce
100 thousand dollars of products which are later all sold to other countries. Our upper bound estimate
of domestic content in the ﬁrm’s exports is 70% ((1 − 30
100) × 100% = 70%). However, if the domestic
intermediates were also produced with some foreign materials and have half of the value is foreign
content (10 thousand dollars), then the precise estimate of domestic content should now be 60%
((1 − 30+10
100 ) × 100% = 60%).
34exports. Electronics industry made up a large proportion of Chinese exports but also
imported large amounts of materials from other countries. Therefore overall vertical
specialisation could have been driven up by the electronics exports alone. Second,
the HIY estimates of domestic value-added are generally higher than our estimates,
which conﬁrms that the HIY method tends to underestimate the real degree of vertical
specialisation or overestimate the real share of domestic value-added.
Table 14. Estimated Domestic Value-Added Shares in Exports
(by Industry)
Industry
Our method, all ﬁrms HIY method, all ﬁrms
03/04 04/05 05/06 03/06 03/04 04/05 05/06 03/06
Petroleum/coking -0.091 -0.077 -0.138 -0.111 0.465 0.440 0.303 0.380
Paper products -0.025 0.099 0.211 0.134 0.300 0.447 0.490 0.421
Electronic equipments 0.250 0.265 0.295 0.281 0.346 0.436 0.438 0.405
Plastics 0.305 0.366 0.447 0.418 0.432 0.491 0.569 0.537
Non-ferrous metals 0.459 0.446 0.441 0.473 0.683 0.728 0.730 0.731
Measuring instruments 0.488 0.515 0.521 0.517 0.520 0.556 0.572 0.561
Printing 0.457 0.533 0.589 0.522 0.560 0.631 0.650 0.595
Chemical ﬁbers 0.592 0.503 0.479 0.535 0.766 0.705 0.692 0.714
Leather/fur/feather 0.504 0.539 0.561 0.563 0.585 0.604 0.620 0.630
Rubber 0.552 0.593 0.595 0.583 0.786 0.780 0.754 0.767
Transport equipments 0.625 0.632 0.646 0.645 0.705 0.698 0.707 0.711
Raw chemical materials 0.654 0.638 0.624 0.647 0.751 0.750 0.744 0.759
Clothing 0.583 0.637 0.694 0.650 0.635 0.686 0.742 0.699
Electrical equipments 0.649 0.681 0.719 0.693 0.705 0.737 0.773 0.747
Timber/wood 0.687 0.749 0.716 0.717 0.700 0.779 0.753 0.745
Ferrous metals 0.707 0.715 0.720 0.719 0.781 0.785 0.782 0.783
Metal products 0.665 0.710 0.757 0.724 0.700 0.752 0.814 0.772
Processing of foods 0.693 0.722 0.733 0.728 0.772 0.808 0.824 0.805
Special machinery 0.677 0.729 0.760 0.737 0.749 0.791 0.818 0.798
Textiles 0.710 0.742 0.758 0.748 0.769 0.798 0.816 0.803
Oﬃce equipments 0.732 0.742 0.767 0.760 0.756 0.769 0.785 0.781
General machinery 0.839 0.798 0.812 0.798 0.811 0.850 0.871 0.854
Medicines 0.819 0.801 0.779 0.810 0.901 0.899 0.893 0.904
Furniture 0.811 0.846 0.869 0.850 0.836 0.863 0.889 0.870
Manufacturing of foods 0.832 0.895 0.878 0.855 0.889 0.921 0.921 0.902
Non-metallic minerals 0.856 0.853 0.855 0.863 0.882 0.873 0.868 0.880
Beverages 0.898 0.920 0.930 0.927 0.937 0.947 0.964 0.959
In table 15, we redo the estimations by restricting the sample to the pure exporters of
the matched sample, which are deﬁned as ﬁrms with more than 95% of their out-
put exported. For many industries which have large export values, such as elec-
35tronic/electrical/transport equipments and textiles, the estimated domestic value-added
share in exports are lower than the estimates with the matched sample in table 14. This
fact implies that pure exporters have higher share of their intermediates imported than
other exporting ﬁrms.
Table 15. Estimated Domestic Value-Added Shares in Exports
by the Sample of Pure Exporters
(by Industry)
Industry
Our method/HIY method, pure exporters
03/04 04/05 05/06 03/06
Ferrous metals -17.362 -14.227 -11.915 -13.469
Electronic equipments 0.156 0.158 0.140 0.166
Raw chemical materials 0.591 0.606 0.396 0.356
Plastics 0.254 0.338 0.415 0.376
Paper products 0.502 0.579 0.730 0.426
Printing 0.475 0.520 0.566 0.504
Transport equipments 0.479 0.533 0.514 0.505
Measuring instruments 0.512 0.552 0.521 0.566
Rubber 0.529 0.601 0.590 0.584
Leather/fur/feather 0.521 0.506 0.585 0.596
Timber/wood 0.662 0.690 0.632 0.627
Clothing 0.560 0.626 0.682 0.631
Textiles 0.578 0.658 0.691 0.634
Non-ferrous metals -0.001 0.716 0.659 0.655
Special machinery 0.646 0.694 0.685 0.659
Electrical equipments 0.635 0.654 0.676 0.665
Processing of foods 0.686 0.699 0.719 0.706
Metal products 0.672 0.738 0.778 0.722
Oﬃce equipments 0.725 0.716 0.743 0.739
Beverages 0.876 0.843 0.881 0.797
Furniture 0.814 0.835 0.862 0.842
General machinery 0.832 0.864 0.865 0.853
Manufacturing of foods 0.848 0.855 0.819 0.855
Non-metallic minerals 0.882 0.882 0.825 0.859
Medicines 0.961 0.908 0.792 0.910
Chemical ﬁbers 0.638 0.868 0.964 0.965
Petroleum/coking . . . .
5.2 Further breakdown of the VS/DV shares
Breaking down the export value into vertical specialisation and domestic value-added
could oﬀer a new perspective on looking at the structure of the Chinese export boom.
36For this purpose, Table 16 shows two groups of information: (1) the shares of vertical
specialisation and domestic value-added, and (2) the breakdowns of the above shares
among sectors. The upper panel of the table oﬀers the ﬁrst information. The share
of vertical specialisation (VS share) is shown to have increased from 68% to 71% from
2003 to 2006, resulting in a decreasing share of domestic value-added (DV share) from
32% to 29%. This is because the VS share grew faster than the ﬁnal export value and
was the primary force of export growth compared to DV growth.
The lower panel gives the breakdown results of the two shares separately. First, not
surprisingly, ﬁrms in the coastal region were the main source of the change in both
the VS share and the DV share, as most exporting ﬁrms were agglomerated in the
coastal region. Second, with regard to ownership diﬀerences, foreign ﬁrms were the
dominant contributor to the VS share growth, while non-state domestic ﬁrms had the
most DV share growth. Many foreign companies in China are vertically integrated with
their mother companies in home countries. They engage in production of relatively
sophisticated products with materials or key parts imported from abroad. In contrast,
non-state domestic ﬁrms, mostly private ﬁrms, are primarily domestically funded. A
number of them are involved in processing trade, but the vast majority have fewer
institutional connections with overseas ﬁrms than foreign ﬁrms. An important reason
is that non-state domestic ﬁrms are much less likely to be vertically integrated with
international companies and thus have fewer chances to import technology-intensive
parts. Finally, we ﬁnd that in the export market, it is existing ﬁrms that largely
pushed up the overall exports by increasing their imported intermediates. On the other
hand, new exporting ﬁrms were responsible for the major part of the decrease in DV
share, implying that these ﬁrms found it easier to import intermediates than purchase
them domestically.
6 Technology Intensity
The issue of the technology intensity of Chinese exports is closely related to the recent
discussion on China’s export sophistication level. Rodrik (2006) and Schott (2008)
consider the similarity of China’s export bundle with high-income countries in order
to reveal how sophisticated China’s exports are. Their evidence suggests that the
37Table 16. Sources of Share Changes in Vertical
Specialisation and Domestic Value-added
Year VS share DV share
2003 0.679 0.321
2006 0.710 0.290














38structure of the Chinese export bundle is increasingly similar to that of high-income
countries (Rodrik, 2006; Schott, 2008). However, a fundamental assumption underlying
the export structure assessments is that the more similar a country’s export bundle is
to high-income countries, the more sophisticated its exports are. This approach could
be misleading in that it does not take into account the fact that the production process
of even the same exported product that actually takes place can be very diﬀerent across
countries.
It should also be noted that although Schott (2008), Xu (2007), and Xu and Lu (2009)
have, to some extent, treat product quality quality as a possible factor to explain the
within-product price gaps, their attentions have not been paid to the production side
behind the product itself. Even if two countries exported exactly the same products of
the same quality, what had happened with production of these products within each
country could be completely diﬀerent stories. Countries export the same products could
have very diﬀerent contributions in value-added to the products exported, given the
increasingly complicated international divisions in production of commodities. In this
case, even if quality was perfectly measured, it would still be far from a full description
of the sophistication story.
Take the computer industry as an example, both China and the U.S. export laptops, but
the U.S. designs and produces many of the key parts such as CPUs itself, while China
usually imports those most sophisticated components from abroad, assemble them with
relatively low-skill labour, and then export the computers as a whole. More generally,
this is exactly what ﬁrms normally do in production for processing exports.24 In this
case, even if China’s export structure is found to be over-sophisticated given its income
level as in Rodrik (2006) and Schott (2008), this can well have been overestimated be-
cause the actual production activities involved in the production of many sophisticated
products in China are in fact not as intensive in skill or technology as in developed
countries. Actually, according to the calculation by Koopman et al. (2008), China’s
24In this paper, the term “processing” is in practice equivalent to the concept of “inward processing”
under which certain goods can be brought into China customs territory for manufacturing or processing
with exportation. On the contrary, the regime of “outward processing” refers to trade under which
goods in free circulation in China Customs territory may be temporarily exported for manufacturing,
processing abroad, and then re-imported. However, this latter regime only accounts for 0.004% of
China’s total trade value in 2005.
39own value-added in its exports is only 50% on average, and is even as low as 20% for
seemingly sophisticated products such as electronic devices.
Since the prevalence of processing trade, or more generally, the presence of international
division of production, can lead to biases with the measurement of sophistication on
the product side, the production process should be taken into account when it is used
to assess a country’s export sophistication. Unfortunately, almost none of the currently
available ﬁrm-level data contains matched information on imports and exports associ-
ated with export production due to consideration of commercial secrets and/or other
reasons. One normally cannot tell how sophisticated a ﬁrm’s contribution exactly is
throughout its production process of exporting products. Therefore,given current data
limitations, it is diﬃcult to explicitly incorporate the production process of exported
goods into rigorous econometric analysis and thus hard to measure the sophistication
of export production process directly. However, despite the data restrictions, there may
still exist some ways by which one can look into the sophistication of export production
process indirectly. A possible approach is turn to examine the production technology
associated with the exports.
Amiti and Freund (2010) recently provide the ﬁrst evidence of China’s export sophis-
tication on the technology side by measuring its skill content indirectly. Their work
is mainly based on Chinese product-level customs data. They plot the cumulative ex-
port share of Chinese industries which are ranked in ascending order of industry skill
intensity along the horizontal axis. Since the cumulative distribution curve is shown
to have been shifting rightward between 1992 and 2005, this is interpreted as evidence
of increasing sophistication of Chinese exports, as exports are now concentrated more
within industries with high skill intensity. However, when processing exports are ex-
cluded from the sample, hardly any shift is found in the cumulative distribution curve
of industry export share. This diﬀerence implies that although the increasing share
of exports from skill intensive industries has been observed, this may well have been
due to the increase in processing exports which rely heavily on imported materials or
parts. Furthermore, when they go on to examine the cumulative distribution curve of
imported inputs share separately for processing imports and non-processing imports, a
much larger increase in the skill content of imported inputs in found for processing im-
ports than for non-processing imports. All together, these ﬁndings suggest that China’s
40exports and imports have both been coming increasingly more from processing trades
with high industry skill intensity, although the skill content change in net exports is
still unclear.
However, this approach is problematic and the result can be misleading if the distribu-
tion of domestic value-added across industries (products) is largely diﬀerent from that
of ﬁnal export value. To see this, suppose China exports only two goods, Christmas
dolls and laptops. The total value of Christmas dolls is 15 million USDs with domestic
value-added 10 million USDs, and the total value of laptops is 85 million USDs with
domestic value-added also 10 million USDs because all the high-value parts are from
the United States. Further, the skill intensity of Christmas dolls is 0.2 while that of
laptops is 0.6. Now if we calculate the overall skill intensity of the exports in terms of
ﬁnal value, the results is 0.54 ( 15
15+85 ×0.2+ 85
15+85 ×0.6 = 0.54). However, the result will
be only 0.4 ( 10
10+10×0.2+ 10
10+10×0.6 = 0.4) if we use domestic value-added instead. This
simple example illustrates that ﬁnal value and domestic value-added could attach very
diﬀerent weights to a product’s skill intensity and could therefore lead to essentially
diﬀerent conclusions on the overall skill intensity of the export bundle.
Besides, the measurement of industry technology intensity in Amiti and Freund (2010)
is also far from being satisfactory. They measure the skill intensities of Chinese indus-
tries in 1992 and 2005 by using Indonesian data in 1992 due to lack of Chinese data.
This could generate bias if the relative skill intensities of Chinese industries in 2005 is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from those in Indonesia in 1992. This gap could be even larger
if Chinese industries achieved more rapid technical improvements than Indonesia did
during the period of over ten years, whether through indigenous innovations or through
foreign technology transfers.
In view of the drawbacks with the current literature, we will study the technology
intensity of exports evaluated both at export value and at domestic value-added. The
latter approach is new to the current literature but can help uncover the real technology
content in Chinese exports. Besides, we will also compare the results obtained with the
two measures to have a look at the discrepancy between them and thus to see how the
previous method could bias the result.
In the meantime, the measure of skill intensity will also be improved. In this study, we
41construct both ﬁrm and sector level skill intensity measures directly based on China’s
own data within the period of export boom, as opposed to resorting to other country’s
data as in Amiti and Freund (2010). The way skill intensity is measured in Amiti and
Freund (2010) is also questionable in that it is simply represented by the ratio of nonpro-
duction workers to total employment. When skill improvement takes replace in other
forms than increase in nonproduction workers or when there is much (product-related)
skill heterogeneity among nonproduction workers (for example, marketing staﬀ versus
lab researchers), this simple measure obviously cannot capture the skill variation cross
sections and over time. Fortunately, however, our data allows us to base our measure-
ments on much richer ﬁrm skill information which includes worker education, worker
skill qualiﬁcation, ﬁrm investment on research and development, and ﬁrm expenditure
on worker training. This rich skill information makes it possible to provide the ﬁrst
evidence from the production perspective on how skill intensive Chinese exports are
and how it changed over time in the export boom after 2000.
By exploring the technology intensity of exports, our study is also related to the the
factor content of Chinese exports. In the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) model, factor
endowment as well as factors embedded in net exports (exports minus imports) are
key elements for predicting the trade pattern of a country. On the empirical side,
however, little is known about the real factor content especially technology-related
factors associated with Chinese exports. Although there still exists the diﬃculty of
directly measuring the technology content of exports, our study uses micro-level data
and is able to provide the ﬁrst-hand evidence on the intensity of the use of technology
inputs in exporting ﬁrms, and therefore can hopefully improve our understanding of
the technology content of Chinese exports.
6.1 Cross-industry diﬀerences in technology levels
Here we use six indices to measure the technology levels for all two-digit industries, as
in Section 4.3. All these measures are now constructed at the industry level. Because
most of the source information that these indices are based on only exists for some
speciﬁc years, we assign these values to other years for each industry, assuming that the
industrial indices do not change over the period under study. This will not be unrealistic
if we believe the relative levels of technology of these industries do not change within
42eight years.
As the above indices measure the technology levels in diﬀerent ways and probably
reﬂect diﬀerent dimensions of technology, we plot them together in Figure 5, where
the horizontal axis represents ranked position of an industry in ascending order in all
27 industries. These industries are arranged from top to bottom along the vertical
axis according to their rankings in education index (proportion of workers with higher-
education degrees).
Figure 5 shows that most of the measures are highly correlated, with their rankings
increasing from top to bottom, although there seem to be a few outliers. One reason
might be that technology can take diﬀerent forms and diﬀerent industries are inclined
to use diﬀerent types of technologies. For example, some industries such as plastics
and metal products tend to have more laboratory experiments or analysis and thus use
more computers than other industries. Some major labour-intensive industries, mainly
clothing and textiles, are at the top part of the ﬁgure, which means that they are
least technology-intensive. Located at the bottom part are industries such as electronic
equipments, ferrous metals, transport equipments and medicines. They are of relatively
high levels of technology in terms of most of the technology measures.
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Fig 5. Rankings of Industries in Terms of Their Technology Measures
436.2 Within-industry technological change in exports
Since the above analysis reveals substantial diﬀerences in technology levels across in-
dustries, we plan to take a look at how ﬁrms of diﬀerent technology levels contributed
to exports within their corresponding industries in order to control these cross-industry
technology diﬀerences. Within-industry examination could uncover useful information
regarding technological change with industry-speciﬁc characteristics excluded. How-
ever, since the data set has information on diﬀerent technology measures only for some
speciﬁc years, we resort to the strategy adopted in Section 4 to expand our analysis to
all the sample years. That is, we restrict our sample to the balanced panel of the CASIF
ﬁrm data and categorize the ﬁrms into two groups: higher-technology group and lower-
technology group by their technology rankings in each corresponding industry averaged
over the years when the technology information is available. We then assign values of
these group labels for each ﬁrm to other years when the technology information is not
available, assuming that ﬁrms do not transit between these groups during the sample
period.
By displaying the shares of export value by each technology group and by year, Fig-
ure 6 depicts a general picture of the evolution of skill content in exports. Firms with
higher levels of technology saw their share of export value in the balanced panel signif-
icantly increased over time, while ﬁrms with lower levels of technology had their share
decreased. It is suggestive of an rising technology content in Chinese exports regard-
less of how the technology is measured, consistent with the widely-existed conjectures
and basic messages conveyed in some of the current studies (e.g., Rodrik, 2006; Schott,
2008).
A more rigorous way to examine this eﬀect requires controlling for more inﬂuential
eﬀects. We do this by regressing the ﬁrm-level growth rate of export value over the
eight-year horizon on ﬁrms’ technology measures and dummies of years, industries, and
ownership types. These dummies are included to capture the diﬀerences in export
growth along the dimensions uncovered earlier in this paper. The results are reported
in Table 17. The control group here comprise ﬁrms with medium levels of technology.
The coeﬃcients of the indicators of higher-technology groups are universally positive







































































































































































































































































Higher−tech group Lower−tech group
Fig 6. Shares of Export Value by Technology Group
groups are signiﬁcantly negative. This further conﬁrms the above conclusion that the
technology content of exports increased as ﬁrms with higher technology levels appeared
to play increasingly larger parts in exports, oﬀering new evidence to the literature on
the technology level of Chinese exports cited above in terms of ﬁrm composition. More
generally, the evidence here emphasises the role of ﬁrms in shaping the technology level
of exports, and thus directs the ongoing discussions at the aggregate level down to more
fundamental economic activity, namely ﬁrm behaviour.
Table 17. Variations of Export Value Growth across Diﬀerent Technology Groups
(Balanced Panel)





Higher-tech group 0.353 0.294 0.314 0.116 0.361 0.272
(0.056) (0.059) (0.054) (0.079) (0.053) (0.091)
Lower-tech group −0.152 −0.074 −0.099 −0.490 −0.092 −0.283
(0.057) (0.055) (0.062) (0.062) (0.059) (0.056)
Note: Dummies for years, industries, regions, and ownership types are included in the regressions as well.
456.3 Industry technology levels and export intensity
Another issue of interest that is related to our broad topic is to examine the diﬀerences
in export behaviour across industries. Since the general technological improvement in
exports have already been well documented, it will be helpful to take a further step
to see how industries with diﬀerent technology levels behaved in their export intensity,
an aggregate measure of export propensity conditional on output. For this purpose,
the matrix in Figure 7 plots the relationship between industry technology levels and
industrial export intensity, which is here the proportion of industrial export value in
sales. The matrix is essentially comprised of diﬀerent scatter plots whose vertical and




















































Fig 7. Industry Technology Measures and Export Intensity
First, the generally positive correlation between the six measures of technology is again
seen in the matrix. Second, the the ﬁrst column from left reveals a remarkable phe-
nomenon — the negative relationships between industry export intensity and degrees of
industry technology levels. The negative correlation indicates that less technologically
advanced industries export higher proportion of their output than more technologically
advanced industries.
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Fig 8. Skilled-Labour Proportion and Export Intensity
To further illustrate the last argument, the scatter plot of export intensity versus pro-
portion of skilled labour is ampliﬁed and displayed separately as in Figure 8, where all
the industries are now weighted by their exports to prevent the general trend implied
from the ﬁgure being over-represented by industries with small sizes. In this scatter
plot, less technologically sophisticated industries like oﬃce equipments, clothing, and
leather/fur/feather have higher export intensities than most of other industries. Indus-
tries with high technology levels such as transport equipments and medicines export
the least. The major exporting industry, electronic equipments, has medium level of
technology but a high export intensity. All these evidence leads to one conclusion:
Chinese exports was still mainly driven by lower-technology industries. If the names
of the industries are seen as coarsely deﬁned products, the above observation reﬂects
China’s comparative advantage in exports was still largely unchanged, albeit obvious
within-industry technological improvement as uncovered before.
6.4 Technology intensity of export value
A simple but eﬀective way to see how exports are distributed among industries with
diﬀerent domestic technology levels is to plot the cumulative distribution of export
value against the industry technology levels, as in Amiti and Freund (2010). To make
the classiﬁcation of industries as disaggregated as possible, we calculate technology
intensities for each 3-digit industries, and to utilise this information, all the analysis
47hereafter is based on the CASIF ﬁrm data.
Before looking into the technology intensity, it might be helpful to ﬁrst plot the distri-
bution against the industry capital intensities, because capital intensity is often adopted
as a general proxy for sectoral or national technology level in the development literature.
The output is shown in Figure 9. We can see that from 2000 to 2007, export value had
been distributed towards industries with high capital intensities, which implies that the
export basket was becoming increasingly “heavy”. Further, the rightward shifts of the
cumulative distribution curves from 2000 to 2007 are clear in Figure 10, indicating that
the overall technology level was increasing as exports from higher-technology industries
accounted for a higher proportion in total exports in 2007 than in 2000. In essence,
this is a similar scenario to what is found in Amiti and Freund (2010).
However, Amiti and Freund (2010) also demonstrate with the tool of cumulative distri-
bution curves that much of the improvement in technology intensity of exports should
actually be attributed to processing exports, for which the technological improvement is
shown to be accompanied by the technological improvement in imported intermediates.
If this observation reﬂects the fact that the technological improvement, which has been
shown in China’s export ﬁnal values, is in fact to a large extent from importing more
high-technology intermediates, the conventional view of “over-sophistication” of Chi-
nese exports should be challenged. This ﬁnding motivates us to reassess the technology
intensity of Chinese exports measured by domestic value-added instead of by export
value.
6.5 Technology intensity of domestic value-added in exports
To show how the above results will be altered when export value is replaced by domestic
value-added in export value, we plot the cumulative distribution curves for both the
share of export value and the share of domestic value-added in the same graph for
the year 2006.25 The results are illustrated in Figure 11 and Figure 12. In Figure 11,
the dashed line lies above the solid line for the section of lower capital intensity. In
comparison with Figure 9, it implies that the real capital intensity of exports is lower
if we evaluate exports in terms of domestic value-added instead of ﬁnal value. In
Figure 12, most part of the dashed lines (only except the line for worker-training) lie


































2 3 4 5 6
Log industry capital intensity
2000 2007


















































































































































































































0 .2 .4 .6
New product
2000 2007
Fig 10. Cumulative Share of Exports with Respect to Technology
Measures
49above the solid lines, meaning that once export value is replaced by domestic content,
less technology intensity is observed. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst direct evidence
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Fig 11. Cumulative Shares of Gross Exports vs. Domestic
Value-Added in Exports with Respect to the Log Capital Intensity
(2006)
7 Conclusion
This paper attempts to provide a systematic assessment of the Chinese export boom
from 2000 to 2007, which made China rise from a top ﬁve exporter to a top two exporter.
The surge was accompanied with dramatic changes in general trade environment re-
sulting mainly from China’s attainment of WTO membership. Such an extraordinary
growth with institutional changes oﬀers us an interesting setting to explore the growth
structure of exports from both theoretical points of view and empirical points of view.
Our study relies on two micro data sets, the ﬁrm survey data and the customs trade
records, and also a unique, comprehensive ﬁrm-product-level data constructed from
them. We ﬁrst analyse the respective roles of ﬁrm entry and ﬁrm expansion in the
export market. The analysis produces some important results. We ﬁnd the net entry
of exporting ﬁrms contributed half of the overall export growth, much larger than what
is found in other studies. Meanwhile, processing ﬁrms are found to have signiﬁcantly
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Fig 12. Cumulative Shares of Gross Exports vs. Domestic
Value-Added in Exports with Respect to Technology Measures (2006)
number. Firms entered into the export market more intensively in labour-intensive
industries, while existing exporting ﬁrms expanded their exports more dramatically in
capital-intensive industries.
It seems that ﬁrm turnover was intensive, but was largely limited to processing trade
and labour-intensive industries. This is probably because these sectors had lower entry
costs of exporting and ﬁrm entry had been important margins whereby ﬁrms could
maximise their gains from the changing trade environment. The above evidence is
consistent with the fact that there were large reductions in trade barriers for Chinese
ﬁrms but also uncovers the huge internal heterogeneity across sectors and the speciﬁc
ways how the trade liberalisation impacted the export market through ﬁrm entry in
China. Besides, we also ﬁnd ﬁrms with best performance tended to agglomerate in
policy zones with favourable export policies, highlighting the positive role of policies in
the Chinese export boom.
We then develop an accounting method to measure the domestic value-added in Chinese
exports, which ﬁts the Chinese case. The method is improved based on Hummels et al.’s
(2001) (HIY) measuring framework of vertical specialisation by taking into account the
diﬀerence between processing trade and ordinary trade. The share of China’s value-
51added in exports is shown to be only 30%, lower than what would be obtained by the
HIY method. The foreign content increased moderately over time, which was primarily
driven by coastal and foreign ﬁrms. We also ﬁnd that entering exporting ﬁrms were
the main source of decreasing domestic content, while existing exporting ﬁrms drove up
the foreign content predominantly. Considering the previous ﬁnding that exporters are
more likely to be processing ﬁrms, the implication here is that engaging in processing
trade in China could greatly probably reduce not only entry costs of exporting but also
variable costs of exporting.
Finally, we examine the technology intensity of Chinese exports. Diﬀerent from previ-
ous studies, we use a wider range of technology measures based on China’s own data
to capture the picture more precisely. As expected, we ﬁnd general technological im-
provement in Chinese exports, although the lower-technology industries are still found
to have tended to export higher proportions of their products than higher-technology
industries. More interestingly, the technology intensity of Chinese value-added in ex-
ports was lower than that of exports measured in export value. The export value was
distributed more towards higher-technology industries but the domestic content showed
less prominent trend. This ﬁnding is novel and it seems that the “surprising” big num-
bers might be to some extent misleading and might have covered some important facts:
technological improvement during the export boom had not changed the product com-
position of China’s own domestic content in exports as much as its ﬁnal export value
implied to many researchers.
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56Appendix A Data Preparation
A.1 Firm-level data (CASIF)
The industries in the CASIF are coded by a unique coding system known as National Stan-
dards (GB/T). Each ﬁrm in the CASIF reports their industry by a four-digit GB/T code. The
coding rule was changed after 2003 when a new version of GB/T was introduced. Because
this change makes the industry codes inconsistent over time, we use our own concordance
table to create a consistent set of three-digit industry codes across the sample period.26
We exclude several industries from the sample, based on two-digit industry codes: mining
(codes: 06, 07, 08, 09, 10, 11), energy (codes: 44, 45, 46) tobacco (code: 16), handicrafts (code:
42) and recycling (code: 43). We exclude tobacco because the production and sales of tobacco
in China is still highly regulated by the government and was not open to foreign investment
even after China’s entry into the WTO. We exclude handicrafts because products from this
industry are potentially highly heterogeneous, as it can includes, for example, production of
artworks. Recycling ﬁrms are excluded because most of the four-digit industries classiﬁed
under recycling before 2003 were integrated into other two-digit manufacturing industries in
the new industry coding system after 2003.
A.2 Transaction-level trade data (CCTS)
Since the focus of our study is on manufacturing exports, an ideal, clean trade data should only
contain all exports of manufactures and their corresponding imports. However, the reality
is that many manufacturing ﬁrms not only use imports of manufactures but also imports
of primary (agricultural) goods to produce manufactures (for example, many ﬁrms in China
import soy beans from abroad to produce cooking oils), we only exclude service trade from the
raw CCTS data, leaving all agricultural and manufactured goods in the trade data. Service
trade corresponds to 2-digit HS codes of 98 and 99.
A.3 Deﬂators and the capital stock
Output and export values are both deﬂated by an ex-factory price index at the two-digit
industry level.
The real value of capital is calculated by the Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM). The formula
26It was not possible to create a consistent set of four-digit codes. The constructed concordance
table is available on the author’s personal page, at http://sites.google.com/site/ralphzwang/.
57we use is
𝑅𝐾𝑡 = 𝑅𝐾0 +
𝑡 ∑
𝑗=1




where 𝑅𝐾 is the real capital stock, 𝐾 is the capital stock in book value, 𝐼 is the investment
in book value net of depreciations, 𝑃 is the deﬂator for investment, and the subscripts denote
time periods. In practice, we adopt the net value of ﬁxed assets, which is nominal value of
ﬁxed assets net of depreciations, in the data set as 𝐾, and the province-speciﬁc ﬁxed asset
investment price index as the deﬂator for investment 𝑃. A practical problem with the above
method is that diﬀerent ﬁrms can have diﬀerent initial years, which means that 𝐾0 does not
necessarily represent capital stocks in the same year. To overcome this inconsistency, we also
deﬂate all 𝐾0 by investment deﬂators.
Because the deﬂator for intermediate inputs is not directly available for each two-digit indus-
try, we impute it by combining information from two sources: the year-speciﬁc purchasing
price index of materials, fuels, and power and China Input-Output Table 2002. Since the
purchase price index of materials, fuels, and power is available for eight broadly deﬁned cate-
gories,27 we then use information from China Input-Output Table 2002 to construct a matrix
that deﬁnes the input weights of these eight intermediate input categories for each two-digit
industry.28 With these weights, we then get the weighted-average of price index (deﬂator) of
intermediate inputs for each two-digit industry.
All the deﬂators mentioned above are from China Statistical Yearbooks of various years. The
122-sector China Input-Output Table 2002 is from the NBSC. We treat the price in the initial
year (2000) as the numeraire for all price indices.29
A.4 Construction of ﬁrm-transaction data
Each ﬁrm in the CASIF and CCTS data has a unique registration code. However, diﬀerent
coding systems are used in each dataset and so this cannot be used to link the data. Our
27They are ferrous metals, non-ferrous metals, chemical materials, wood and paper pulp, construction
materials, agriculture products, and textile materials.
28There are three input-output tables available for the sample period from 2000 to 2007, which are
input-output tables for 2000, 2002, and 2005. However, the input-output table for 2002 is the most
disaggregated (122 sectors versus 40 sectors for 2000 and 17 sectors for 2005), and therefore enables us
to aggregate the those sectors to two-digit GB/T industries more precisely in order to be in line with
the CASIF industries.
29All these deﬂators are available on the author’s personal page, at http://sites.google.com/
site/ralphzwang/.
58solution is to use ﬁrm name, which is unique to the ﬁrm,30 as a means to identify ﬁrms in
both datasets. We ﬁnd that matching by ﬁrm name is the most eﬀective way because ﬁrm
names are less likely to be missing or changed during the year than other proﬁle information.
The two datasets do not completely intersect for a number of reasons. First, the CASIF data
includes a large number of non-trade ﬁrms, which cannot appear in the CCTS data. Second,
ﬁrms who export via trading agents are recorded as exporters in the CASIF data, but their
exports will be recorded under the name of the trading agent in the CCTS data. Third, the
CASIF data only includes larger ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector, while the CCTS data
records all trade including that by small ﬁrms and ﬁrms outside the manufacturing sector.





































Fig A1. Graphical Illustration of the Matching Result
Table A1 gives information about the proportion of ﬁrms, output and exports in the CASIF
data which appear in the matched CASIF-CCTS data. Less than 20% of ﬁrms in the CASIF
data appear in the matched data, but this is partly because only about one-quarter of ﬁrms
are exporters (see Table 1). However, we also see that only 50% of exporting ﬁrms in the
CASIF appear in the matched data. As noted, the most plausible explanation for this is that
the remaining ﬁrms classiﬁed as exporting in the CASIF are exporting via trading agents.
Table A2 gives information about the proportion of customs-registered ﬁrms, imports and
exports in the CCTS data which also appear in the matched CASIF-CCTS data. The matched
data contains about 20% of all customs-registered ﬁrms, about 25% of imports and about 30%
of exports. There are three reasons for these “seemingly” big gaps. First, the cleaned CCTS
30The registration of ﬁrm in local administrative authorities does not allow any repetition of ﬁrm
name in the same local administrative region. This means there exists the possibility that ﬁrms in
diﬀerent administrative regions can share the same name. However, after checking the data carefully,
we ﬁnd virtually all ﬁrms have the local region name (e.g., “Beijing City”) as part of their ﬁrm name.
This fact reduces the possibility of mismatching due to ﬁrm name repetition to a minimum level.
59Table A1. Number of Firms, Number of Exporters, Output, and Exports of








Nominal Real Nominal Real
2003 16.48 46.12 37.42 38.09 57.68 57.74
2004 17.03 49.55 38.42 39.54 59.14 59.17
2005 18.44 48.36 38.10 39.49 56.90 56.77
2006 18.25 50.82 37.15 38.95 59.64 59.76
Table A2. Number of Customs-Registered
Firms and Value of Customs Imports and
Exports of the Matched CASIF-CCTS Data as









2003 18.33 25.12 28.26
2004 22.39 26.03 29.52
2005 21.06 26.34 31.04
2006 20.42 25.87 30.36
60data contains the universe of all non-service trade, and therefore includes trade by small ﬁrms
(whether by themselves or via agents) which are not included in the the CASIF data. Second,
the cleaned CCTS data includes trade by the agricultural sector, which we have excluded from
the cleaned CASIF data. Third, there exist a large number of trading agents in the CCTS
data. Although there is no explicit indicator of trading agents in the CCTS data, we attempt
to identify them by searching in their ﬁrm names for a set of keywords speciﬁcally related to
trading agents.31 Firms whose names contain these keywords make up approximately 16% of
ﬁrms and about 20% of the trade volume recorded in the CCTS. Given these considerations,
we believe that the matched sample is representative of large- and medium-sized ﬁrms which
import and export themselves.
A.5 Deﬁnitions of Chinese customs regimes
The Chinese customs regimes recorded in the CCTS data are described in Table A3.
A.6 Product-industry concordance
We construct a concordance table which relates eight-digit HS product codes with four-digit
GB/T industry codes, based on the handbook Product Categories in Statistical Works released
by the NBSC. We ﬁnally obtain a concordance table which matches more than 5,600 eight-
digit HS products with more than 460 four-digit GB/T industries.32
A.7 Identiﬁcation of intermediate inputs in ordinary imports
Identifying imported intermediate inputs is important for computing vertical specialisation in
exports. It is clear that all processing imports are used as intermediate inputs as they could
only be used for the purpose of processing exports. Another group of imported intermediate
inputs are in the category of ordinary imports. Since only some of ordinary imports are
used as intermediate inputs in production, it is necessary to identify these intermediates from
others (namely, consumption goods or capital goods) in ordinary imports. Following Dean
et al. (2007), we ﬁrst use the detailed classiﬁcation of the Broad Economic Categories (BEC)
to identify the BEC codes for intermediates as in Table A4. Then, we employ the BEC-HS
31We use 21 keywords, including the Chinese characters for “agent”, “logistics”, “cooperation”,
“storage”, and so forth. The full list of keywords and the searching codes are available on the author’s
personal page, at http://sites.google.com/site/ralphzwang/.
32The concordance is is available on the author’s personal page, at http://sites.google.com/
site/ralphzwang/.
61Table A3. Deﬁnitions of the Chinese Customs Regimes
Regime code Regime name Deﬁnition
10 Ordinary trade Unilateral imports or exports through customs.
11 International aid Aid or donations given gratis between governments or by international orga-
nizations.
12 Donation by overseas
Chinese
Donations given by overseas Chinese or compatriots in Hong Kong, Macau
or Taiwan.
13 Compensation trade Imports of equipment supplied by foreign ﬁrms or by using foreign export
credit under a contractual arrangement for the supplier to recover the cost
with the subsequent exportation of products in installment.
14 Processing and assem-
bling
The type of inward processing in which foreign suppliers provide raw materi-
als, parts or components under a contractual arrangement for the subsequent
re-exportation of the processed products. Under this type of transaction, the
imported inputs and the ﬁnished outputs remain property of the foreign sup-
plier.
15 Processing with im-
ported materials
The type of inward processing other than processing and assembling in which
raw materials or components are imported for the manufacture of the export-
oriented products, including those imported into Export Processing Zone and
the subsequent re-exportation of the processed products from the Zone.
16 Goods on consignment Goods traded by arrangement in which a seller sends goods to a buyer or
reseller who pays the seller only as and when the goods are sold. The seller
remains the owner (title holder) of the goods until they are paid for in full
and, after a certain period, takes back the unsold goods.
19 Border trade Petty trade carried out in the border towns of China, between the de-
partments or enterprises designated by the governments of provinces or au-
tonomous regions and the border towns on the other side, as well as to the
mutual market trade between the border inhabitants of the two neighboring
countries.
20 Equipment imported for
processing trade
Imports of equipment for processing trade activities under the customs
regimes of processing and assembling and processing with imported Materi-
als.
22 Contracting projects Exports of equipment or materials to be used for China-invested turnkey
projects or constructing projects.
23 Goods on lease Imports or exports under the ﬁnancial lease arrangement with the duration




Imports of equipment, parts or other materials by a foreign-invested enter-
prise as part of its total initial investment.
27 Outward processing Exports of raw materials, parts or components under a contractual arrange-
ment for processing or assembling abroad and the re-imports of the processed
products.
30 Barter trade Exported goods directly exchanged with the equivalent in imported goods
without any currency medium.
31 Duty-free commodity Duty-free import commodities sold in the speciﬁc shops to the speciﬁc in-
dividuals on payment of foreign currency according to the speciﬁc customs
regulations.
33 Warehousing trade Goods imported into or exported from the customs bonded warehouses lo-
cated outside a Bonded Area.
34 Entrepot trade by
bonded area
Goods imported into a Bonded Area for storage and the re-exports of the
goods from the Area.
39 Others Others
Source: The General Administration of Customs of China.
62concordance table from the United Nations to further identify intermediates in the HS system.
Table A4. Intermediate Goods Classiﬁed under the Broad Economic
Categories (BEC) and the Harmonised Commodity Description and
Coding System (HS)
BEC code Description HS code
111 Primary food and bever-
ages mainly for industry
See the BEC Rev.3 - HS
2002 correspondence ta-
ble
121 Processed food and bever-
ages mainly for industry
As above
21 Primary industrial supplies
not elsewhere speciﬁed
As above
22 Processed industrial sup-
plies not elsewhere speciﬁed
As above
31 Primary fuels and lubri-
cants
As above
322 Other processed fuels and
lubricants
As above
42 Parts and accessories of
capital goods (except trans-
port equipment), and parts
and accessories thereof
As above
53 Parts and accessories
of transport equipment,
and parts and accessories
thereof
As above
Note: The BEC classiﬁcation of intermediate goods is from UCSD (2003). The BEC Rev.3
- HS 2002 correspondence table can be downloaded on the UN Statistics Division website,
at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regdnld.asp?Lg=1.
Appendix B Identiﬁcation of ﬁrm entry into export markets
The CASIF data does not include “below-scale” ﬁrms (with annual sales roughly below 5
million RMB). It is therefore possible that a new entry in the data represents existing ﬁrms
crossing the size threshold, or genuinely new ﬁrms. Similarly, ﬁrms which appear in the data
as new exporters could be existing exporters which have crossed the size threshold or new
63ﬁrms which have set up as exporters.
The CASIF data contains information on the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst year of business, which allows us
to calculate current ﬁrm age, and thus distinguish between genuinely new ﬁrms from ﬁrms
which have crossed the size threshold. Table B1 compares the age distribution of new and
existing ﬁrms. The ﬁrst row shows that only 8.4% of ﬁrms which appear for the ﬁrst time in
the CASIF data are genuinely “new” in that their age is less than one year. This strongly
suggests that the majority of entry into the data is caused by ﬁrms crossing the size threshold.
However, nearly 70% of these ﬁrms are less than ﬁve years old, compared to 40% of exist-
ing ﬁrms. This shows that ﬁrms which cross the size threshold tend to be young, and so
interpreting entry into the data as ﬁrm entry is not too misleading.
Table B1. Distribution of the Ages of New Firms and New Exporting
Firms, 2000–2007
age=0 1≤age≤5 age>5
(a) All ﬁrms New ﬁrms? 8.39% 61.26% 30.36%
Existing ﬁrms? 0.29% 39.60% 60.10%
(b) New exporting ﬁrms? New ﬁrms? 6.05% 44.17% 21.89%
Existing ﬁrms? 0.10% 14.45% 13.34%
?Firms that appeared in the CASIF data for the ﬁrst time at 𝑡.
?Firms that appeared in the CASIF at 𝑡 and 𝑡 − 1.
?Firms that exported for the ﬁrst time at 𝑡.
?Firms that appeared in the CASIF data for the ﬁrst time at 𝑡 and exported at 𝑡.
?Firms that appeared in the CASIF at 𝑡 and 𝑡 − 1 and exported for the ﬁrst time at 𝑡.
The third row of Table B1 shows that only 6% of ﬁrms which enter the data as exporters are
genuinely new ﬁrms. We cannot tell whether the remaining 94% of these ﬁrms were exporters
at 𝑡 − 1 because they were not in the CASIF sample. The ﬁnal row of Table B1 shows that
the transition rate from non-exporters to exporters in the “above-scale” sample is about 28%,
comparable with studies such as Bernard and Jensen (2004b) (30% over eight years).
To address this problem more precisely, we will combine the CASIF data with the database
of the First National Economic Census of China from the NBSC. The First National Eco-
nomic Census of China was conducted in the end of the year 2004 and covers all ﬁrms and
non-production organizations in 2004 in China, regardless of scale. We extract the whole
population of manufacturing ﬁrms from the census database and then compare them with the
sample of ﬁrms of 2005 from the CASIF data.
64It is now possible to trace precisely the statuses of the “above-scale” exporting ﬁrms in 2005
back in 2004. The result is reported in Table B2. Only 1.7% of new exporting ﬁrms are
misclassiﬁed as they did export in the “below-scale” cohort in the previous year. According to
the 2004 Census database, 37.4% of manufacturing exporters are “below-scale” manufacturing
ﬁrms, but they only account for 2.3% of total manufacturing exports. Therefore, only a very
small part of “below-scale” exporters switched to “above-scale” exporters in the next year. On
the contrary, about 93.3% (1.11%+92.15%=93.26%) of currently new exporting ﬁrms are from
non-exporting ﬁrms in the previous year, of which the vast majority used to be non-exporting
ﬁrms in the “above-scale” sample. All together, the evidence from the comparison between
our sample and the Census data demonstrates that our identiﬁcation of new exporting ﬁrms
is 98.3% correct on a year-to-year basis, or 88.7% ((98.3%)7=88.7%) correct on an eight-year
basis.






at (𝑡 − 1)?
Below-scale
non-exporters
at (𝑡 − 1)?
Above-scale
non-exporters
at (𝑡 − 1)?
5.04% 1.69% 1.11% 92.15%
?Exporting ﬁrms in 2005 that did not exist in the 2004 Census.
?Exporting ﬁrms in 2005 that existed in the 2004 Census.
?Exporting ﬁrms in 2005 that existed as “below-scale” exporting ﬁrms in the
2004 Census.
?Exporting ﬁrms in 2005 that existed as “below-scale” non-exporting ﬁrms in
the 2004 Census.
?Exporting ﬁrms in 2005 that existed as “above-scale” exporting ﬁrms in the
2004 Census.
65